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PREFACE 
The following pages supply a new appraisal of the last years of 
Mexican New Mexico. Mexican sources during this period show that 
problems of foreign encroachment, Indian affairs 9 and financial insta-
bility caused the New Mexican government to stagnate in its responsi-
bilities both to its inhabitants and to the central government in 
Mexico City. Governors Manuel Armijo and Mariano Martfnez were not 
bumbling despots but men caught between the ambitions of the United 
States, the Republic of Texas, Mexico, and numerous hostile Indians 
while simultaneously serving the people of New Mexico. These governors 
managed to save the department of New Mexico for Mexico for nine years 
despite these conflicting powers. It is for this accomplishment that 
/ 
Armijo and Martinez should be remembered. 
The major sources used in writing this paper consisted of microfilm 
copies of the governor's papers, legislative reports:, judicial cases~ 
and military reports from the New Mexico State Archives and Records 
Center. These reports were in manuscript fo:r:m except some proclama-
tions issued by authorities in Mexico City. Educated officials such 
as Governor Martiriez and Mexican officials used many archaic writing 
fo:rms. They combined words, used many abbreviations, and employed a 
double "r" for an initial 11r." In additionj they interchanged "b" and 
"v," "i" and "y," and "s" and "c" before consonants. Lesser_officials 9 
who could barely write, would scribble their messages in order to hide 
their ignorance of writing techniques. Because of these factors many 
iii 
of the translations were difficult. Nonetheless, the tr.anslations that 
appear on the following pages are mine, and I assume full responsibility 
for their content. 
I would like to take this opportunity to express my thanks to my 
major thesis advisor, Dr. Odie B. Faulk, who directed my attention to 
these reels of microfilm and their wealth of information. His assist-
ance in organizing q plan of study, encouraging my work with Mexican 
sources, and reading this thesis was invaluable. Further gratitude is 
owed to Dr. Michael Smith and Jack Obreg6n who gave much assistance in 
translating the more difficult passages of these documents. A special 
note of thanks goes to the Oklahoma State University Library Staff, 
especially Vicki Withers, who located and obtained many important 
sources for this study. Finally, I wish to acknowledge the many 
sacrifices that my wife, Vicky, had to endure while this thesis was 
being written. 
iv 
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From 1837 to 1846 New Mexican officials were given the impossible 
task of keeping order in an area which was out of touch with Mexico, 
rampaged by Indians, and under constant threat of foreign invasion. 
National policies were not designed for frontier situations such as 
New Mexico; the very real fear of Indian attacks and depredations to 
New Mexicans was but a statistic to officials in Mexico City. Real 
and imagined threats by the Texans and Americans were largely ignored 
by the federal .government until the situation was out of hand. In 
addition to these problems, the chronic shortage of money forced the 
New Mexican government to pursue a policy of hopeful waiting in which 
··-
funds received through taxation of goods entering New Mexico by Santa 
Fe traders provided the mainstay of departmental finance. The combina-
tion of these conditions forecasted the ruin of the department no matter 
how effective and forceful New Mexican officials were. Try as they 
might, the Indians were unbeatable, the Americans unstoppable, and the 
treasury unfillable. 
In 1837 conditions were ripe for revoltuion in New Mexico. The 
people were poor, Indians harassed the countryside, and foreign inter-
vention was always imminent. To make matters worse, the newly organized 
central government in Mexico had radically altered the governmental 
structure of the nation with a new constitution. While politicians in 
1 
2 
Mexico grappled with the organization of a new government, New. Mexicans 
generally looked after their own affairs as they always had done in the 
past. Local government was controlled by the ricos from Rio Abaja~ and 
, .. 
gubernatorial appointments were usually given to the Bacas, Chavezes, 
and Armijos. Although the people had always been poor, there was a· 
traditional acknowledgement of leadership to these ricos who at least 
were products of New Mexican envirorunent. 1 
These conditions were changed with the Constitution of 1836. This 
centralist cons.titution provided that Mexico should be divided into de= 
partments, governors be appointed by the president, and departmental 
councils be organized. Further~ a direct tax was enacted to support 
the departments and their many responsibilities. Hereafter, each de-
partment would be expected to pay the sal.aries of all its governmental 
officials and military officers and soldiers, expenses incurred in the 
defense of its borders, and civil projects for the people. The first 
/ . ·. 
governor of New Mexico under this system was Colonel Albino Perez, an 
army officer. Unfortunately, he was not a resident of the territory. 
,,. . 
Perez came to New Mexico with high hopes. In many instances he 
attempted to improve conditions within the department. His decrees 
for establishment of a public school system exemplify this desire to 
help New Mexicans. However well intentioned were his policies, he 
-·-· 
failed to recognize that he was dealing with a two-class socie.ty~ 
the many ignorant poor, and the few politically dominant ricos. In 
pursuing his policies of direct taxation and independent government~ 
1L. Bradford Prince, Historical Sketches£!. New Mexico (New 
York: Leggat Brothers, 1883), p. 285. 
Pfrez alienated both sections of society. 2 
In 1836 charges were made against certain disbursing officials in 
New Mexico for alleged embezzlement. The men were found guilty but 
before sentence could be passed, Governor Pe?ez removed the ~en irnm 
court and eventually allowed them to go free. While these officials 
were being tried, Manuel Armijo discharged the duties of these 
officials. After the trial, P:"rez restored the original officials to 
their posts causing Armijo to lose his position. Not only ange.ring an 
3 
,,,,,. 
influential rico, Perez also enraged the lower class. These peoplewere 
well aware of the cupidity and corruption in parts of their government 
and did not need an official investigation to prove it. But to see an 
official convicted of embezzlement and then set free only increased 
their scorn for the new administration. 3 
Discontent was further aggravated when a decree from the Mexican 
government, issued April 17, 1837, became known. Under this decree 
the governor of each department was charged with collecting taxes for 
both the national and departmental treasuries. 
~ 
Perez was ordered to 
witness the examination of all drafts and monthly cash statements and 
4 
to appoint inspectors to insure efficiency and honesty. Before long, 
rumors circulated through the department saying that a husband would 
be compelled to pay a tax for the privilege of sleeping with his own 
2Lansing B. Bloom, "New Mexico Under Mexican Administration," 
Old Santa Fe, Vol. II (July, 1914), 4. 
3w. W. H. Davis, El Gringo (New Yorkg Harper & Brothers, 1851)~ 
p. 86. 
4Decree of April 17, 1837, in Ralph Emerson Twitchell, Leadin_g 
Facts of New Mexican History, Vol. II (Cedar Rapids, Iowag The 
Torch Press, 1912), pp. 56-7. 
wife. False reports such as this were believed by the people, who 
5 were too ignorant to inquire into the truth of the matter. 
The entire affair came to a head in August when an alcalde at 
Taos was imprisoned by Ram[n Abreu, prefect and close associate of 
Pe'rez. The Indians in the Northern districts became a mob and. in 
short ordsr effected the release of the alcalde. Shortly ther~after, 
the mob obtained arms and received support from other Mexicans, 
gathering at Santa Cruz, some twenty-five miles north of Santa Fe. On 
4 
the third of August, a plan of government and declaration of principles 
was written. 
Long live God and the nation and the faith of Jesus 
Christ, for the following principles which we defend: 
1. To be with God and nation and the faith of 
Jesus Christ. 
2. To defend our country until we spill every drop 
of blood to obtain the desired victory. 
3. Not to accept the departmental plan. 
4. Not to accept any tax. 
5. Not to accept the disorder by those who are 
attempting to effect it.6 
While some historians have accused Manuel Armijo of organizing this 
revolution, it appears rather that the Indian pueblos of Northern ·New 
Mexico were the instigators. Pueblos such as San Juan took an active 
-~ -- 7 
part in the revolt, while only the pueblo of Taos remained uninvolved. 
Josiah Gregg, an American T:rader in Santa Fe at the time of the_ revo-
lution, wrote that the pueblos had always been ripe for insurrec-
SD . av1s, El Gringo, p. 87. 
6Revolutionary Plan of August 3, 1837, Santa Cruz, Mexican 
Archives of New Mexico, 1821-1846; (Santa Fe: New Mexico State 
Library and Archives. Available on microfilm). ijereafter cited as 
MANM. 
7 Myra Ellen Jenkins,-"Taos Pueblo and Its Neighbors," New Mexico 
Historical Review, Vol. XLI (April, 1966), 107. 
8 tion. Nonetheless, the revolutionaries had become a formidable army 
and Governor P~ez was forced to disband it. 
Pel'ez was able to assemble only one hundred and fifty men, mostly 
Indian auxiliaries. At La Ca~ada his forces were attacked by the 
revolutionaries resulting in the capture of twenty-five governmental 
. ./ troops, the death of six more, and the escape of Perez to Santa Fe. 
The prisoners were tied and left in the jail at Santa Cruz while the 
revolutionaries followed the governor to the capital. 9 
, 
Perez was 
captured the next day and he, along with eleven other officials,-~s 
brutally mutilated before being executed. 
On the ninth, the insurgents, some two thousand strong, made camp 
around the capital. Traders such as Gregg were uneasy lest the rabble 
plunder the city and take vengeance against· foreign merchants. But to 
the surprise of the Americans and other traders, the mob remain~a- :... 
outside the city and dispersed after electing Jose"Gonzales of Taos 
as governor, who as Gregg wrote, was a good buffalo hunter but a very 
ignorant man. The revolutionaries denied their allegiance to Mexico, 
and even proposed sending a message to Texas asking for protection. 
At this point, Manuel Armijo apparently began to form a counter-
r':voi.µtil"Il t_o prese~e .,;.t~-~;_:,dep~tmen:l.);;~{>t,.;t;he~Me'.1C:i.can govertunent. lO 
The early background of Manuel Armijo is clouded in mystery. 
Some s.ay he was raised of a· good family, but as the legend goes, was 
8Josiah Gregg, Connnerce of the Praires (Dallas: Southwest Press, -- . 
1933), P• 81. 
91nvestigation of the Conduct of Sargeant Donaciano Vigil During 
the Revolt of August, 1837, Santa Fe, January 2, 1838, MANM. 
10 Gregg, Connnerce, pp. 81-5. 
5 
left without an inheritance because his father had hidden the family 
treasure. Because Armijo was forced to begin life in very moderate 
circumstances, he most often was regarded as a self-made man who 
taught himself to read and write and work~d up to positions in 
11 government because of perserverence. Others claim that Armijo 
married well by taking a Ch!"vez as a bride and thus, never fel; the 
need for money. With this financial backing, Armijo entered t:'he: pros-
perous Santa Fe trade and lived in the style of a rico in Rfo Abajo. 12 
6 
Armijo served one term as governor from 1827-1829, while New Mexico had 
territorial status, along with other lesser positions. By September, 
1837, whether for reasons of patriotism or personal gain~ he began 
,,, 
organizing against the government of Jose Gonzales. 
After the victory of the revolutionaries, the leaders summoned 
a Junta Popular (people's assembly) for August 27, 1837. Invitations 
were sent to all classes of New Mexicans with the hope of organizing 
a new government on a popular base. Gonzales wanted to align himself 
with the ricos, for included on the list were Manuel Armijo, Padre 
/ / 
Jose Antonio Martinez, and Juan Esquibel. These three men were named 
as a commission to give assurances of the loyalty of the new govern-
ment to officials in Mexico. The commission never presented the rebel 
case to the Mexican government because Armijo took matters into his 
13 
own hands. 
llWilliam A. Keleher, Turmoil in New Mexico (Santa Fe: The Rydal 
Press, 1964), p. 115. 
12Erna Fergusson, New Mexico: ~ Pageant of Three Peoples, 2nd 
ed.; (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), p. 250. 
13Phillip Reno, "Rebellion in New Mexico--1837," New Mexico 
Historical Review, Vol. XL (July, 1965), 205. 
7 
Events in Santa Fe had been moving rapidly. On September 6, J~sl 
Caballero was recognized as commandant principal by the remaining 
officers that had previously served under Perez. These men were loyal 
to the centralist government in Mexico and wished 'to end the suffering 
14 , c'.', 0" 
throughout the department. Two days later at Tome, Armijo issued a 
proclamation de1daring that the measures taken by the revolutionaries 
threatened to destroy peace and property. Therefore Armijo said he 
would command the army until the supreme government in Mexico decided 
on the proper action to be taken. The next day, September 9, Caballero 
offered the services of the militia in order to restore peace. By the 
fourteenth, Armijo was accepted by the military as "chief of the 
liberating army"; all pledged allegiance to the centralist govern-
15 ment. 
I ., 16 
Gonzales was left with little choice but retreat. This genizaro, 
or Mexican-Indian halfbreed, fled Santa Fe for the northern pueblos 
early that September. Upon entering Santa Fe, Armijo wrote a letter 
to the Mexican authorities containing a full account of affairs in 
New Mexico and stressing the importance of his own accomplishments 
in restoring the department to Mexican authority. On October 13, the 
minister of war advised Armijo that he had received the appointment 
of governor of New Mexico by order of the president. 17 Recognized 
14Recognition of Josf Caballero etc., Santa Fe, September 6, 
1837, MANM. 
15Proclamation by Jose Caballero et al., Santa Fe, September 
14, 1837, MANM. 
16 ,. . , ~ 
Angelico Chaves, ''Jose Gonzales, Genizaro Governor," New 
Mexico Historical Review, Vol. XXX (July, 1955), 190-4. , 
17Minister of war to Armijo, Mexico, October 13, 1837, MANM. 
/ /-
only in Rio Abajo as governor, Armijo extended his authority to Rio 
Arriba by appointing local officials. By December, his control was 
assured except for remnants of the revolutionists under Gonzales in 
the north. 18 
While Armijo was unifying his control over local officials, the 
Mexican government took steps to aid Armijo and crush the rebellion 
by sending four hundred additional troops from Chihuahua. These 
soldiers were in Santa Fe by January as evidenced by a proclamation 
-
issued by Armijo warning the citizens not to increase prices of goods 
19 
to be sold to the troops or to buy arms and ammunition from them. 
With these troops Armijo led his own auxiliaries to La Ca'fiada where he 
defeated the rebels and took Gonzales prisoner. The rebel leader, 
when brought before Armijo, boldly asked for guarantees against -imple-
. ~- ' -- .. 
mentation of the tax. If such assurances were given, Gonzales said, 
8 
peace again would be restored in the pueblos. Armijo answered by 
ordering Padre Jost'Antonio Martfuez to provide confession for Gonzales 
in order that he could be shot. 20 
Armijo's methods for gaining control of the department at times 
were harsh, but a weak man would not have been able to unify the 
country. New Mexico was in the throes of civil war and revolution; 
had such a strongman not appeared, New Mexico might well have been 
lost to the Mexican government. Once in office, Armijo returned to 
proper legal methods in operating the department. Estates of former 
18 
Reno, "Rebellion in New Mexico--1837," 209. 
19p 1 · f A · · S F J 12 183 8 MANM roe amat1.on o rm1.Jo, anta e, anuary , , • 
20p . r1.nce, Historical Sketches, p. 289. 
9 
goverrunental officials were inventoried, with a description made of 
goods along with an evaluati0n of these goods. Evidence of confisca-
tion by Armijo is not supported by any documents. Rather the opposite 1 
as in the auctioning of the estate of Albino PEfrez to meet treasury 
21 
expenses, was the rule. 
Armijo's reward for restoring peace to the Department of New 
-
Mexico was his appointment as its governor. Although the office was 
considered a prize by most, it became a burden for Armijo:, and even-
tually caused his resignation in 1844. As head of the Department of. 
New Mexico, Armijo faced the same problems that plagued Pe"rez. He 
broadly interpreted his powers as governor, however, and modified the 
--
unsuitable policies of the Mexican goverrunent; only thus could he sur-
vive as governor. He became more than a governor, and because of his 
different roles as trader, judge, lawmaker, and soldier, he was able 
to remain in charge of the department. People who were useful to 
Armijo in fulfilling one or more of his roles were rewarded and pro-
moted; those who stood in his path were dealth with by arbitrary 
justice. Only through the efforts of Manuel Armijo, and for a time 
/ 
Mariano Martinez, did New Mexico enjoy some degree of stability. ·· The 
remainder of Mexico suffer~d recui::~ing revolutions. That Armijo 
remained governor for eight years is a testament to his pragmatic 
approach towards goverrunent. 
21Proceedings of the Settlement of the Estate of Albino Perez, 
Santa Fe, March 5, 1838, MANM. 
CHAPTER II 
NEW MEXICAN LIFE 
Maintaining a stable government in New Mexico was a chore for the 
departmental governors owing to the erratic nature of the federal 
government in Mexico. Mexicans regarded Antonio 14ez de Santa Ann-a 
with suspicion and distrust after his Texas fiasco in 1836. The 
centralist government expressed this suspicion in the Constitution of 
1836 by creating an inner clique of five members called the Foder 
Conservador, which was designed to dominate congress and newly elected 
President Anastasio Bustamente. In 1838 Santa Anna regained prominence 
during the French "Pastry War," and in 1841 lead a coup which .forced 
the resignation of Bustamente. Santa Anna instituted rule by decree, 
and maintained his position until a similar coup led by Mariano 
Parades in late 1844 replaced him with Jost' Joaqui~ Herrera as chief 
executive. These struggles between conservatives and liberals, 
federalists and centralists, only increased dissention in New Mexico. 
Because the Mexican government was usually in turmoil, New Mexi-
cans largely were forgotten and their problems ignored. The citizens 
were well aware of conditions in Mexico and looked to their own 
officials for leadership. Donaciano Vigil, a leading citizen-of Santa 
Fe and member of the militia, expressed these views. Expecting pro-
·-
tection from the supreme government was a vain hope, especially due 
to the different factions that were constantly being formed, usually 
10 
for personal gains and not patriotic aspirations. "Therefore," he 
wrote, ''I believe that for our interests and security we should not 
rely upon more protection and resources than what New Mexico itself 
can furnish. 111 It was this independent attitude of New Mexicans that 
would dominate governmental affairs. 
Before the adoption of the centralist constitution, the province 
of New Mexico was controlled by territorial government. Executive 
, . -
leadership was in the hands of the Jefe Politico, or political chief, 
and legislative ~atters were handled by the Diputacion Provincial 9 or 
provincial assembly. After 1837 New Mexico received departmental 
status with a governor and departmental junta. Executive powers of 
the governor immediately dominated the legislative junta, because ;,.the 
junta met only twice during the governorship of Armijo. With the 
arrival of Mariano Martfuez as governor in 1844,. the legislature be..: 
11 
2 came more prominent in assisting the governor in departmental matters. 
In addition, lesser officials such as alcaldes, prefectos, and 
jueces formed the link between law and enforcement. The alcalde, or 
mayor, was responsible not only for political affairs in his district, 
but also was charged with defending it against Indians and foreigners. 
In many instances it appears that the alcaldes also had judicial 
powers. In everyday life the alcalde would hold court, and upon 
hearing evidence on the matter under consideration would give an im-
mediate verbal decision. His judgment was law, and appeals of ~he 
1speech of Donaciano Vigil to Departmental Assembly, Santa Fe, 
May 16, 1846, William G. Ritch Collection, Microfilm Copy (Pasadena~ 
Huntington Library). 
2 
Gregg, Commerce, p. 147. 
decision would have to be taken to Chihuahua or Durango. The 
prefecto was a combined county commissioner and probate judge." - iris 
12 
duties, and those of other local officials such as the juez, mixed to-
gether to such an extent as to make any clear definition of powers 
· "bl 3 1.mposs1. e. 
- - -
While political affairs were controlled by the governor, military 
affairs were under the jurisdiction of the commandant general. Al-
though created as separate offices, these posts ultimately were dis~-
charged by the same person. When Armijo became governor in 1837, 
military jurisdiction over his department was exercised by the com= 
mandant general in Chihuahua. By a decree of April 22, 1839, the 
minister of war changed this procedure by establishing a commandancy 
generalship in New Mexico which no longer would be subject to control 
by Chihuahua. Henceforth, reports would be sent directly to the 
4 minister of war. Armijo was immediately appointed commandant general. 
He.received the position because of his distinct and meritous service 
to the Mexican govermnent. He was congratulated for his atte~pts- to-
preserve peace in New Mexico, and was charged with the duty of de-
fending the rights of all Mexicans. 5 
Thus, after June 1839, Armijo had both political and military 
·-. 
authority in New Mexico. By the end of 1843 Armijo had been forced 
by illness--he said--to resign the governorship. After the second·--
Texan invasion in 1843 his powers as commandant general also were 
3Twitchell, Leading Facts, Vol. II, pp. 9-15. 
4 
Decree of minister of war, Mexico, April 22, 1839, MA.NM. 
5Appointment of Armijo as commandant general, Mexico, June 24, 
1839, MANM. 
13 
removed in order that Mariano Martinez of Chihuahua could re.organize 
the military in New Mexico. While governor and commandant general, 
Armijo channelled departmental matters through the minister of war 
with little reverence to form or ceremony. ·Administrative details 
were often delayed or neglected because he had little money with which 
to convene the assembly regularly. Reports concerning administrative 
actions were casually forwarded to the central government, if they 
6 
were sent at all. 
A number of reasons combined to cause Armijo's resignation as 
governor in 1843. Mexican authorities became concerned that Armijo 
was losing control of his department after the Texan forcesj commanded 
by Jacob Snively, appeared on the Santa Fe Trail and successfully de-
feated the Mexicans at Mora. Armijo was expected to capture the 
invaders as he had done in 1841; this timell Armijo lost face by allow~ 
ing the American Dragoons to save the New Mexicans by disarming the 
Texans. To the central government this meant that Armijo had lost 
control of the frontier and the defense of the department. In 
addition, reports had been received by the Mexican gover:ri.ment tl:lat there 
was widespread corruption in the customs houses, allowing the entry 
of contraband goods into the nation. To regain control of the situa-
tion, Santa Anna closed the northern ports to foreign commerce and 
allowed the appointment of Mariano Mart:i:n.ez as governor and commandant 
general to become effective. 
/ . 
With the arrival of Martinez in New 
Mexico, the department experienced a true renaissance in goverrunental 
administration. 
6 
Bloom, ''New Mexico Under Mexican Administration," Vol. II, 
130-2. 
/ 
Mariano Martinez first was appointed as corrnnandant general in 
October 1843, and then in April 1844 became governor. During the 
interim of four months between Armijo's resignation in January, 1844, 
/ 




Once in office, Martinez took immediate steps to improve 
conditions in the department, one of which was the improvement of 
internal defenses and the limitation of Indian depredations; this 
14 
called for a reorganization of the department into sections of defense. 
In this reorganization of the department, three districts were 
created. The central district would have its capital in Santa Fe 
and would be composed of three sub divisions. The district of the 
north included Rfo Arriba and Taos, although the capital wo:uLd, 
be at Los Luceros. The southwest district contained. two further 
districts with the capital at Valencia. 7 Next, Mart(nez realigned 
the judicial districts to correspond. with the new plan. In explaining 
this reorganization, the governor pointed out that no careful dis-
pension of justice could be made in the department under previously 
prevailing conditions. Furthennore, some jurisdictions had areas of .. 
nine square leagues while others had less than two. In accomplishing 
this reorganization, not only was a better judicial system provided 
,, 8 
but also new appointees owed their allegiance to Martinez. 
In attempting to revamp New Mexico, Martinez found that Httle 
could be accomplished without the support of the populace. He re-
7Mart~ez to the inhabitants of New Mexico, Santa Fe, June 17, 
1844, William G. Ritch Collection. Translation in Twitchellj Leading 
Facts, Vol. II, p. 15n. 
8Martfnez to President of Departmental Assembly, Santa Fe, June 
29, 1844, MANM. 
so·reed to many announcements and encouraging promises to the people,._ 
by which, he hoped, morale would improve: 
New Mexicans: In order to obtain objects so important, 
I count on the cooperation of your respected governor, 
on assistance from the Supreme Government, which neither 
distance nor obstacles of any form are insurmountable 
when concerned with our well-being. But principally, I 
rely on your patriotism, virtues, and courage, as 
exemplified at Antt1n Chico and always remaining true to 
to these ideals • .Always you will be able to rely on 
your friend and fellow citizen, Mariano Martfnez. 9 
Although it is doubtful that New Mexicans were moved by his phrases 
about loyalty and responsibility to th~ federal government, some 
probably were impressed with the governor's attempts to beautify Santa 
Fe. 
Marti~ez' first goal was to improve the plaza where no trees or 
---
15 
vegetation existed. Trees were brought to Santa Fe from the mountains, 
planted around the plaza in symmetrical arrangement, and shortly there-
after were irrigated. In addition, the first park was created ~n the 
northwest side of the city. After irrigating the area, flowers'"a°iid 
trees grew and made a striking scene. 
~ . 
Demetria Perez, son of Governor 
Albino P~ez, wrote that norie of the citize~s could remember afl that 
, 
Governor Martinez had done for them. Funds for many projects came out 
of Martinez' personal account, while the reforms made in civil and 
. . . ·--10 ·-
·~ilitary administration were to the benefit of all New Mexicans • 
.,,, . 
Unfortunately for New Mexicans, the administration of Martinez 
proved to be a_short one. The governor became involved in the c.oup of 
9 
Commandant general of New Mexico to its Inhabi.tants, Santa Fe, 
December, 1843, MANM. 
100 . ·emetr1.o 
by L. Bradford 
1927), 92. 
Perez, 11ln Santa Fe During the Mexican. Regirp.e," ed. 
Prince, New Mexico Historical Review, Vol-. II. (January, 
1844 to displace Santa Anna. In a letter to Armijo, Marti{ie~ sought 
a declaration from the ex-governor as to his loyalties, The astute 
Armijo refused to sign any declaration of loyalty and scolded Martinez 
by writing that such gestures oh the part of New Mexicans could result: 
in bloodshed throughout the department and might make the department 
· b d 1· h 11 appear in a a ig t. Once the new government of Herrera was 
established, Mart{nez was caught in the embarrassing position of sup-
porting the wrong revolutionary. " By February, Martinez had been re-
moved as corrnn.andant general. His duties were assumed by Armijo on May 
1, 1845. 12 From January through May, 1845, New Mexico was virtually 
/ 
adrift politically. Martinez returned to Chihuahua, and the depart-
16 
mental assembly elected Mariano Cha'vez as governor--but he died May 16. 
. ; . . 
His replacement was Jose Chavez~ who was approved by President Herrera 
in the summer. 
13 
Meanwhile, Commandant General Armijo attempted to restore his 
good name by writing certain Mexican officials. Armijo explained that 
he had been unjustly disgraced by his previous removal as commandant 
general in 1843; and he offered his services as an experienced leader to 
Mexico and the president. After the New Mexican Departmental Assembly-
nominated Armijo for the position of governor~ reports from Mexican 
officials announced that Armijo once again was governor. Thus from 
November 16, 1845, until the American capture of Santa Fe in August of 
1846, Armijo discharged the duties of both governor and commandant 
11Martinez to Armijo, Santa Fe, January 17; 1845, MANM. 
12 
Bloom, "New Mexico Under Mexican Administration," Vol. II,· 234n. 




general. During Annijo' s .final term he governed New Mexico even :more 
independently than in previous years owing to the wors,ened circum-
stances in the department because of the Indians and the growing threat 
of an American invasion. 
Both governors mainly used the army to control affairs in the 
department. In reality, the military forces in New ~exico comprised 
two different units, the regular army and the rurales, or militia. 
For the most part, the troops were used to ward off Indian attacks and 
to keep communication open with the interior provinces. The department 
was expected to pay and care for these troops, an impossible task ·awing 
to the scarcity of revenue. Nor were the citizens in New Mexico im:. 
pressed with the few troops that did defend the province. The supreme 
government, constantly engaged and occupied with more general interests, 
was not able to give New Mexicans the protection and attention that they 
required. Donaciano Vigil wrote that the few troops .in.:the .depa';t't;m,e:nt 
were employed in the capital, which was the theater of party strife, 
and were used for sustaining the authorities arid preserving order among 
the inhabitants. Because of their small number, their destitute con-
dition, and their want of nearly every necessity, they could defend 
only the point at which they were stationed. In the opinion of Vigil, 
New Mexico alone needed thousands of well-disciplined and equipped 
. f . 15 troops to protect its rontiers. 
-· 
Armijo's military policies were shaped by conditions such as those 
outlined by Vigil. Because of the departmental system inaugurated :!,n 
14Annijo to minister of treasury, Santa Fe, November 16, 1845, 
MANM. 
15vigil, May 16, 1846, Ritch Collection. 
1837, the national government continued to place increasing responsi-
bility for the military defense of New Mexico on Armijo. After 1839, 
customs collections were unreliable because of their seasonal nature; 
these were collected only in the summer and fall. With no money for 
supplies and salaries during the winter and spring, it was difficult 
keep an effective fighting force in the department. Other problems, 
such as officers living in Chihuahua while connnanding troops in New 
Mexico, habitual sickness, and an advanced average age of the troops 
16 
also plagued the commandant general. 
By 1841, conditions had degenerated just as the likelihood of a 
Texan invasion increased. Armijo was forced to rely on volunteer 
18 
to 
service of New Mexican residents, of whom he believed some 1,500 would 
serve without pay if help did not arrive. 17 The makeshift remedies 
that the national government provided did little to aid the situation; 
plans were made to have the armies from neighboring departments give 
assistance, but supplies for New Mexico never arrived. By October, 
1841, after the Texan invasion had been stopped and while Armijo enjoyed 
great popularity, he threatened to resign if the department was not 
18 
supported with supplies and troops~ 
Perhaps because of Armijo's incessent pleas for aid, Santa Anna in 
1842 ordered a complete reorganization of the volunteer militia. 
Companies of calvary from outlying haciendas and all companies of 
rurales from the major villages were to be established and placed 
16A .. rmJ.JO 
17Ibid., 
to minister of war, Santa Fe, May 29, 1839, MANM. 
March 1.7 and May 7, 1841. 
18rbid., October 22, 1841. 
19 
under the direct conunand and inspection of the governor. However, this 
had little direct effect on New Mexico because Annijo already controlled 
these companies by virtue of his combined office of governor and com-
mandant general. The crux of the problem 9 finances and supplies, was 
handled most effectively by the goverrunent. Responsibility for arms, 
ammunitions, and supplies for the volunteers would be placed on the 
governor, who was to use departmental funds for such expenses. Owners 
of haciendas would also be expected to assume the cost of maintaining 
h 1 1 11 d . . ff" 19 t e ca vary as we as es1.gnat1.ng o 1.cers. 
In another decree designed to improve the military, the national 
goverrunent sought to make army careers more attractive. Officers wish-
ing to advance in grade could attend military academies in Chihuahua. 
Each cadet would receive two years' instruction under approved military 
masters. One year would be given to academic training and drilling on 
foot, and another would emphasize calvalry tactics and techniques of 
administration. Only two recruits could be sent by each department, 
20 
but all expenses were to be borne by the national goverrunent. 
President Santa Anna also authorized special considerations and 
honors for valiant military service. For Annijo 1 s triumph over the 
Texans in 1841, he was awarded the Cross of Honor. Governors of the 
individual departments were authorized to give distinctive emblems to 
troops who were deserving of such honor. Finally, Santa Anna empha-
sized that military efficiency and good morale required that all 
salaries be paid as they came due. For New Mexico this was virtually 
19 Decree of Santa Annaj Mexico, January 18, 1842, MANM. 
20General treasurer of the Nation to treasurer of New Mexico, 
Mexico, July 6, 1842, MANM. 
21 impossible, as Armijo so noted on the decree. 
,,,,. 
When Martinez assumed control of the department in 1843 9 he 
20 
inherited the same problems that had plagued Armijo. The regular troops 
numbered only two hundred in Santa Fe and approximately six hundred 
in the entire department. However, many of these numbers included 
troops who were on temporary leave either from Chihuahua or Vera Cruz. 
According to documents for the year 1844, most of the enlistees were 
illiterate men between the ages of sixteen and twenty-five. It was 
with these forces that Governor Martfnez was expected to stop foreign 
invasion, fight hostile Indians, and maintain law and order in the 
22 
department. 
Life in the army was somewhat monotonous. Discipline was usually 
maintained 11 for the conflicts that occasionally occurred were more the 
result of personal disagreement than of insubordination. For example, 
Private Aldava was standing guard with his dog when Lieutenant 
Manuel Flores passed him with his own dog; the animals started to 
fight, whereupon the lieutenant drew his sword and killed Aldava's dog. 
Aldava then threatened Flores with his pistol but did not fire. 
Charges of insubordination were pressed against the private, but Com-
mandant General Martfnez freed Aldava. Few cases of insubordination, 
of any type, come to light during this period. 23 
Financing the department became almost impossible for Martfuez 
21 General treasurer of the Nation to Armijo, Mexico, October 12, 
1842, MANM. 
22M'l' d C R d f 1844 MANM i itary an ompany ecor s · or , • 
23court martial of Encarnaci&".n Aldava, Santa Fe, July 11, 1844, 
MA.NM. 
21 
by March, 1844, because it had been cut off from its usual source of 
revenue. Prior to September, 1843, departments were expected to pay 
their individual expenses and maintenance from the customs revenues 
an.d the extraordinary taxes laid on embargoes and manufacturing. Yet 
the national government closed New Mexico's ports of entry to all 
trade from September 1843 to March 31, 1844. The decree reopening 
the customs houses did not reach Santa Fe until July 11 1844, however, 
and thereby increased the firtincial crisis. 
Although few troops were stationed in New Mexico, a military 
organization did exist and did cost money to support. The average 
monthly expense for maintaining troops in New Mexico was almost ten 
thousand pesos. (see Table I). As H. H. Bancroft noted, "the truth 
seems to be that here [New Mexico], as in California during the 
larger part of Mexican rule, the military organization hardly existed 
24 
except on paper," but the expenses had to be paid. If they were 
not, morale reached extremely low levels. It appears that this level 
was reached by 1845 when citizens began reporting to Armijo that 
soldiers. arbitrarily took animals and other supplies because none 
25 had been requisitioned for them. 
From the beginning of A:rmijo's tenn as governor in 1837, he 
was plagued by a shortage of funds to support his administration. 
Money never seemed to accumulate in adequate reserves 9 and the 
central government was unable to bolster Armijo's depleted treasury. 
Directives from the national government announced measures which were 
24Bancroft, History of New Mexico and Arizona (San Francisco~ 
Ghe History Company, 1887), p. 313. 
25Armijo to Sena, Santa Fe, October 13, 1845, MANM. 
TABLE I 
MONTHLY MILITARY EXPENSES IN NEW MEXICo26 
Expenditure 
Salary of the corrnnandant general 
Perm.anent artillery 
Salary of secretary 
Salary of doctor 
Cavalry regiment no. 2 
Cavalry regiment no. 3 
Salary for active calvary in Albuquerque 
Presidial Cavalry from Chihuahua 
Permanent New Mexican companies of calvalry 















intended both to provide funds for the nation and to encourage the 
departments to become more self-sufficient. In fulfillment of these 
ends, a decree of February 1, 1842, made the commandant general 
inspector of the departmental treasury, which in effect gave Armijo 
d 1 1 h f . 27 ua contra overt ese · inances. Anti-Mexicans, such as Waddy 
22 
Thompson (the American ambassador), failed to recognize this arrange-
ment between national and departmental governments. He wrote that 
"General Annijo, the Governor of that Department, kept all the 
28 revenues himself and paid nothing to the government," apparentJy 
26 f s - . Report on expenses o permanent troops in New Mexico, anta Fell 
July 11, 1844, MANM. 
27 Decree of Santa Anna, Mexico, February 1, 1842, MANM. 
28waddy Thompson, Recollections of Mexico (New York and Londong 
Wiley and Putnam, 1846), pp. 229-30. 
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unaware that this was the designated method for financing the depart-
ment--especially as New Mexicans were exempt from many national taxes. 
Because of a decree in 1838, New Mexicans enjoyed a period of 
grace until 1845. During this time they did not have to return any 
revenue to the central treasury. This exemption was intended to 
compensate New Mexicans for the sacrifices they made in financing 
. . h I d" 29 campaigns against t e n ians. Additional provisions passed by the 
Mexican government also gave further privileges to New Mexicans. To 
reward them for defeating the Texans in 1841, the president ordered a 
monthly payment of five thousand pesosj from both the customs at 
Mazatla{ and the tobacco taxes in Chihuahua, to the New Mexican 
government. Unfortunately for New Mexicans, these payments appear 
never to have been paid by the customs at Mazatlan, and only infre-
quently by the customs operating the tobacco monopoly in Chihuahua. 30 
Another example of.New Mexico's privilege was the measure relating to 
forced loans. In the instance of meeting Mexico's debt to the United 
States, the minister of the treasury assigned all departments a 
specific amount to be raised--except.California, Yucat&ni, and New 
Mexico. 
. 31 
These frontier departments were exempted from the burden. 
Because funds from Chihuahua and Mazat15n seldom were delivered, 
Armijo was forced more and more to rely on trade with the United 
States, although small amounts of revenue were collected by local 
29Decree establishing uniform rates in all departments, Mexicoi, 
J'ul y 11, 1843, MANM. 
30 
Decree of President Santa Anna, Mexico, February 1, 1842, MANM. 
31 . 
Decree to establish payment of debt to the United States 1 
Mexico, April 20, 1843, MANM. 
24 
officials. Justices and alcaldes probably derived revenue from fines 
and the sale of pubLit;:, goods claimed from estates of deceased citizens. 
Money administered through the municipality of Santa Fe also appears 
to have originated from fines, and a few direct taxes on the casas 
de comercio, or dry goods stores. In most cases this scanty revenue 
was used for salaries, repair of public buildings, and in some in-
stances, policing a pueblo. On the departmental level, funds were 
derived mainly from customs, special loans from the central goverru:nent 9 
32 
forced loans from New Mexicans, and, rarely, direct taxes. 
The tax structure and collecting agencies in New Mexico came 
under revision in 1842, when new laws were passed. Rulings concerning 
excise taxes on internal and external commerce were strengthened when 
all matters of finance were brought under control of the connnandant 
general. In New Mexico, Governor Armijo appointed his brother, 
Ambrosio, to the positions of inspector and secretary of the treasury. 
During the days of the second Texan invasion in 1843, Ambrosio was 
removed by the governor. In 1843, taxes were imposed on paper, sugar, 
liquor, and numerous luxury items. In additiony taxes on certain 
professions, such as carpenters and silversmiths, also were levied. 
Direct taxes such as these usually were not enforced in New Mexico, 
although Armijo did collect taxes from distilleries in 184.5. 33 
The most drastic renovation came in July 184.3 with a decree 
establishing uniform rates of taxes in the department. For the most 
part, this decree concerned the alcabala, or tax on goods traveling 
32Armijo to Departmental Treasurer, Santa Fe, January 23, 1841, 
MANM. 
33 Decree of Acting President Bravo, Mexicoy April 5, 1843, MANM. 
25 
between departments. Many items under the heading of produce were 
allowed to pass duty free, while goods made of wood, rope, and bathtubs 
were taxed at 2.5 percent. Foodstuffs generally were categorized under 
a five-per-cent tax, except for liquor which were taxed at 12.5 percent. 
However fruitful these taxes might have been for the treasury in New 
Mexico, Armijo apparently still had a strong memory of the Revolution 
in 1837, which had originated from opposition to direct taxes; thus 
34 many of the taxes ordered into effect in 1843 were not collected. 
When conditions in the department reached the crisis stage, envoys 
were sent to Chihuahua to beg for the monthly five-thousand-peso allot= 
ment for New Mexico. After this failed, the last step taken was a 
forced loan. 
,/ 
In January 1845, Governor Martinez was faced with such a 
situation and asked the departmental assembly for a loan of twelve 
thousand pesos. The assembly decided that the best recourse would be 
to make individual assessments on leading citizens to provide the 
35 funds. In spite of the financial crisis, no one paid the assess-
ments. The greatest shock to the governor came when Armijo, the 
36 commandant general, refused to pay his one thousand pesos. When 
news of the forced loan reached Taos, Charles Bent wrote Manuel 
Alvarez that Marti~ez had lost face because of the episode. He added 
that New Mexicans wou.ld pay their assessments only if Armijo returned 
34Decree establishi.ng uniform rates in all departments, Mexico, 
July 11, 1843, MANM. 
35 
Decree of departmental assembly, Santa Fe, February 14, 1845, 
MANM. 
36Marti~ez to Armijo, Santa Fe, March 11, 1845, MANM. 
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to office as governor, for the citizens had confidence in him. 37 And 
when Armijo did return to the office of governor, conditions eased 
because of the arrival of trade caravans. 
While matters of finance and miiitary defense had special con-
cern for governmental officials, the majority of citizens in New 
Mexico were preoccupied with daily life. For these New Mexicans, 
farming, livestock, and irrigation were their main concerns. Because 
of the arid climate, water control had special meaning for farmers. 
The main source of this life-preserving liquid came from Rit del Norte~ 
or Rio Grande, which was the artery of New Mexican life. The. mother 
ditches from the river were under the supervision of the alcaldes, who 
were charged with their repair and maintenance. Only through this 
38 well-designed system of irrigation could crops be grown. 
In addition to caring for the mother ditch, other natural re-
sources were the common responsibility of the people. One of these 
was the village well, where water would be used for cooking and 
drinking by all the inhabitants. Citizens were warned to guard these 
wells from bathers, or "other filthy practices which are harmful to 
their health." Those who ignored the law were to be fined four reales 
(half a peso). Comm.unity care of the roads was another responsibility 
of the people. Men were assigned by the alcaldes to do their share of 
work in maintaining these supply lines and could be fined for failure 
37 Bent to Alvarez, Taos, March 30 9 1845, "The Charles Bent Papers," 
New Mexico Historical Review, Vol. XXX (October, 1955), 340. 
38 Gregg, Corrnnerce, pp. 96-7. 
27 
to do 39 so. 
The fanns in New Mexico always were grouped together and never 
isolated because of the ever-present danger of Indian attack. Houses 
were built so that they resembled a small one-story fort with but 
few windows to the front. Larger houses, called haciendas, were built 
in a square with a large courtyard in the center. In the interior, 
stables were arranged to protect stock against Indians and thieves. 
These haciendas sat on huge tracts of land which were worked by poor 
Indians or Mexicans, who in reality were little more than feudal serfs. 
They received from the hacendado food, lodging, and clothing which 
they had to pay for when possible. Because they never were able to 
accumulate enough money to do this, the system resulted in debt 
40 peonage. 
The major crops produced in the department were corn and wheat, 
the fonner a staple in the daily meals which invariably included 
tortillas. Although the climate was suitable for cotton and tobacco, 
little was grown. According to Gregg, the govermnental monopoly on 
tobacco, which made it illegal to transport the leaf through the 
republic under pain of confiscation, discouraged its growth. Some 
.,, 
vineyards were productive in the valley of the Rio del Norte? but 
orchards of apples, peaches, and apricots were of inferior quality and 
391ynn I. Perrigo, ''New Mexico in the Mexican Period, as Revealed 
in the Torres Documents," New Mexico Historical Review, Vol. XXIX 
(January, 1954), 31-2. 
4°Ford Dixon, ed., "Cayton Erhard's Reminiscences of the Texan 
Santa Fe Expedition, 1841," Southwestern Historical Quarterly, Vo 1. 
LXVI (January, 1963), 453; A. Wislizenus, "Memoir of a Tour to Northern 
Mexico, United States Senate Documents 18, 30th Cong., 1st Sess., 
Serial No. 511, pp. 23-4. 
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eaten only as a last resort. 
Besides agriculture, New Mexicans paid much attention to stock-
raising, especially of horses, mules, cattle, sheep, and goats. In 
1846, however, Adolph Wislizenus wrote that little care was taken in 
maintaining a good breed, which resulted in small physical size of 
sheep but which increased the flocks to large proportions. Because 
of the large tracts of available grazing land, and the good climate, 
the flocks could be turned out for grazing the entire year. 42 
But by far, the most important indigenous product of the 
soil of New Mexico is its pasturage •••• They are 
remarkably destitute of the gay flowering plants for 
which the former [the United States] are so celebrated 9 
being mostly clothed with different species of a highly 
nutritious grass called grama, which is of a very short 
and curly quality •• , being rarely nipt by the frost 
until the rains are over, it cures upon the ground and 
remains excellent hay.43 
Although the prairie provided high quality pasturage for livestock, 
it simultaneously afforded little protection from wandering tribes 
of hostile Indians who reasoned that as the land belonged to them so 
28 
must the sheep, and a never-ending battle over the question resulted. 
Although New Mexico was always a frontier area, civilization 
continually made progress into its backward state. In the field of 
education, Armijo complained to the minister of interior affairs that 
New Mexico could not afford schools 9 which, as a consequence, caused 
citizens to be illiterate, thereby making it difficult to find quali-
fied people to fill judicial vacancies. The cause for this unhappy 
state of affairs could not be placed altogether on the central 
41 · · 
Gregg, Commerce, pp. 100-1. 
42wislizenus, "Memoir," p. 24. 
43 
Gregg, Commerce, p. 103. 
44 government, however. 
As early as April 1838, the minister of the interior provided 
for an inspection of all branches of public education in the republic, 
during which the inspectors would report all information directly to 
the minister for action. He added that the improvement of education 
was important in order to maintain the high level of public intelli-
f h . 45 gence o t e nation. Positive steps toward accomplishing this goal 
were taken by President Santa Anna in 1842. He decreed that in order 
to remedy the poor state of public education, every departmental 
capital was to establish a primary school for each ten thousand· 
inhabitants. 46 However, no mention was made of funds to support suc.h 
a program, and apparently no schools were built in Santa Fe, however, 
the proprieta~y class continued to receive brief and rudimentary 
education through private schools run by Manuel Alvarez and Guadalupe 
Miranda. 47 
/ _.,, 
While Padre Jose Antonio Martinez of Taos usually is credited 
with introducing the first printing press to New Mexico, it appears -rather that the Abreu brothers brought the first one in 1835. After 
their death at the hands of the revolutionaries in 1837, Mart~ez 
came into possession of the press, which he used rather infrequently 
29 
for printing religious matters and occasionally political proclaIJ1ations. 
44Arrnijo to minister of interior and foreign affairs, Santa F~, 
April 27, 1841, MANM. 
45 
Decree of minister of the interior and foreign affairs, Mexico, 
April 9, 1838. 
46 Decree of Santa Anna, Mexico, October 26, 1842, MANM. 
47 Bloom, "New Mexico Under Mexican Administration," Vol. II, 135. 
30 
Not until 1844 was a newspaper titled La Verdad begun in the department. 
This paper was but another outgrowth of Governor Martfuez' policy of 
starting a renaissance in New Mexico. The paper was to be printed each 
Thursday, (but most usually was not) and to be sold at one real. Un-
fortunately, only two copies of La Verdad survive. 48 
Within the social and religious realm, the Catholic Church was 
dominant, making it difficult to judge exactly where civil authority 
ended and church authority began. When assuming office, civil authori-
ties were expected to instruct the people in the rudiments of the 
Catholic faith in their particular district, ''guarding carefully like-
wise the greatest glory of God and punishing severely the public 
and scandalous sinners. 1149 The civil official, usually the alcalde, 
also was charged with the responsibility for the collection of tithes. 
To carry out this duty, he was e:x;pected to keep detailed records of 
the property, animals, and crops of each citizen in his district; from 
these records he would compute the amount of the tithe expected from 
each person. Citizens were admonished not to work on Sundays or during 
church festivals. But on 0,ther days o"f'the week, Santa Fe and Taos were 
marketing centers, probably with ample business in both the stores and 
h . 50 t e cant1.nas. 
Primitive and remote as it was, New Mexico was unattractive to 
most foreigners, and even ·.at times to its ow:n inhabitants. The first 
48oouglas C. McMurtrie, ''The History of Early Printing in New 
Mexico," New Mexico Historical Review, Vol. IV (October, 1929), 373-82. 
49Perrigo, "New Mexico in the Mexican Period, as Revealed in the 
Torres Documents," 37. 
50Armijo to the city council, Santa Fe, August 17, 1843, MA.NM. 
impression of James Webb, an American trader, was that there was 
nothing in Santa Fe to induce him to become a resident or to continue 
51 in the trade except as an adventurer. Contributing to the remote-
ness was the lack of a newspaper--until 1844--which increased depend-
ency on proclamations, rumors, and the irregular mail service for news. 
Wagon trains and traders traveled to the main plaza, while Indian 
tribes camped in vacant yards or near the edge of town. Horses and 
livestock were allowed to graze in the street until March 1843 when 
Armijo notified the city council that roving hogs and large dogs had 
become a public nuisance in the plaza; he demanded an ordinance to 
prohibit such action in the future. 52 
Removing the animals from the streets of Santa Fe was much 
easier for Armijo to accomplish than ridding the department of many 
of its frontier characteristics. Life for the New Mexicans was hard, 
and it was not greatly improved by the departmental government. Fi-
nancial crises marked departmental policy to such lengths that its 
effects were felt in every area of administration. The army and 
rurales could not be supplied, their weapons repaired, or their mounts 
maintained. Auxiliary squadrons that came to New Mexico expected to 
be paid and supplied by Armijo; this caused constant worry for the 
government. By 1845 Armijo requested that the central government send 
only troops that were fully equipped and supplied or to send no~e at 
51James Josiah Webb, Adventures in the Santa Fe Trade, 1844-1847, 
ed. by Ralph P. Bieber (Glendale: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 
1931), P• 91. 
52Armijo to the city council, Santa Fe, March 24, 1843, MANM. 
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au. 53 As payment of salaries to officials was spasmodic at best, 
many used their office only as a means of self-preservation. Vigil 
wrote that most officials had abandoned the true interests of the 
country and endeavored only to live from their offices at the expense 
of the nation regardless of their capacity to fill them. 54 Yet it was 
on this poorly equipped and underpaid army and militia and on these 
self-serving officials that Armijo and Marti~ez found themselves 
increasingly dependent in protecting the department against the attacks 
of barbarous Indian and foreign inva:de.:i;~ •. 
53Armijo to minister of foreign affairs, Santa Fe, May 16, 1845, 
MANM. 
54vigil, May 16, 1846, Ritch Collection. 
CHAPTER III 
THE TEXAN INVASIONS 
In 1841, New Mexico was a frontier department plagued by foreign 
encorachments, Indian depradations, and unpatriotic citizens. At 
least this was the situation as seen by Governor and Commandant 
General Manuel Armijo. The Santa Fe Trail had brought not only sub-
stantial profits to New Mexico but also many foreigners who were 
constant trouble for the governor. The Navajos, Apaches, Comanches, 
and Utes were virtually unchecked along the frontier, causing wide-
spread killing and huge property loss. Worse, there was the fear that 
many Mexicans were sympathetic to Texan and American schemes of annexa-
tion. In this maze of problems, Armijo in 1840 heard reports of an 
impending invasion by the rebellious Texans. As governor of New 
Mexico, Armijo had the responsibility to defend the department and 
preserve this frontier department for Mexico; he accomplished both 
goals quite satisfactorily. 
Little attempt at secrecy was made by President Mirabeau B. 
Lamar of Texas concerning the expedition; newspapers in Austin and 
St. Louis carried accounts of the proposed journey. After months of 
1 hesitation, the expedition left Texas on June 20, 1841, for the pur-
pose of extending control over Texan domain as defined by the Treaty 
1Noel M. Loomis, The Texan Santa Fe Pioneers (Norman: University 
of Oklahoma Press, 1958), p. 18. 
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of Velasco (1836), and also--paradoxically--establishing peaceful 
corrnnercial relations with the Mexicans. In preparing the expedition, 
Lamar previously had sent Williams Dryden to Santa Fe in 1840 to fur-
ther Texan interests. On March 10, 1841, Dryden reported~ 
every American, and more than two thirds of the 
Mexicans, and all of the Pueblo Indians are with us. 
heart and soul; and whenever they have heard of your 
sending troops, there had been rejoicing; and indeed 
I have talked many times with the governor, and he says 
he would be glad to see the day of your arrival in this 
country, as he feels well-assured that no aid will be 
sent from below. 2 
If the purpose of the expedition was one of establishing commercial 
relations, 3 it is interesting to note the emphasis placed on the 
sending of troops and not of merchants. Dryden's statement that 
he had conferred many times with the governor is not substantiated by 
the governor's papers during these years. While there was talk of this 
sort on the part of New Mexicans, it was not to the extent that Dryden 
4 reported. 
Nonetheless, with false information such as this and with pros-
pects of territorial and economic profit, this legally unauthorized 
expedition of 320 men under the corrnnand of Colonel Hugh McLeod departed 
2Dryden to Lamar, Santa Fe, March 10, 1841, in A. K. Christian, 
"Mirabeau Buonepart Lamar," Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XXIV 
(October, 1920), 111. 
3Houston to Santa Anna, 1842, in Twitchell, Leading Facts, Vol. 
II, p. 71. Also see George Wilkins Kendall, Narrative of the Texan 
Santa Fe Expedition (Chicago: The Lakeside Press, 19291: i;-:-s. 
4 Governor's Papers, 1840-1841, MANM. See also William Binkley, 
New Mexico and the Texan Santa Fe Expedition," Southwestern Historical 
Quarterly, XXVII (October, 1923), pp. 89-90. 
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5 for Santa Fe. The actual journey was one of poor leadership and ex-
treme hardship. The personal accounts of the trek thoroughly discuss 
the starvation, Indian raids, and undisciplined troops. The men in 
the expedition had little knowledge of the desert they were abouf to 
cross. The originally intended five hundred miles to Santa Fe became 
more than one thousand after backtracking and misdirection. The expe-
dition left too late in the year to find grass and water and thus had 
little help along the route. This merchant caravan, as the newspapers 
termed the expedition, included 270 troops and approximately fifty mer-
chant, along with one brass howitzer. The group had more men than 
necessary to fend off the Indians, yet too few to attack a foreign 
. 6 nation. 
Although New Mexico was removed from the main communication 
lines of the country, news of the invasion filtered in to Armijo. In 
March 1840, Armijo was informed that approximately five hundred Texans 
7 were on the way to Taos. While this report proved to be false, it 
does show that the governor had the necessary time to prepare the de-
partment for an invasion. In his correspondence to the minister of 
war, Armijo gave an accurate account of the events leading to the 
actual arrival of the Texans in September and October of 1841. 
5Hubert Howe Bancroft, History of North Mexican States and _ 
Texas (San Francisco: The History Company, 1889), Vol. II, p. 333. 
Also see Loomis, Pioneers, p. 9. 
6Thomas Falconer, Letters and Notes 2!! ~he Texan Santa Fe Expe~ 
dition 1841-1842 (Chicago: Rio Grande Press, 1963); Franklin Combs, 
"Combs' Narrative of the Santa Fe Expedition in 1841," New Mexico 
Historical Review, V (July, 1930), 305-314; Erhard, "Cayton Erhard's 
Reminiscences of the Texan Santa Fe Expedition, 1841," 424-456; and 
Kendall, Narrative. 
7Armijo to minister of war, Santa Fe, March 17, 1840, MANM. 
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His concern over the expected invasion is clearly evident in his 
correspondence. By June 1840, Armijo had become alarmed over the 
attitude of some New Mexicans: ''Many of the• people expect better con-
ditions from the Texans and thus refuse to help defend this land. 1 ~- Per-
haps he overstated his position in order to receive aid from the central 
government, but he did.have definite cause for concern. Because New 
Mexico was so great a distance from Mexico City, the inhabitants had 
few economic or political ties with the national govermnent. Indeed, 
since the opening of trade with the United States in 1821, 




The constant theme running through Armijo's letters to the minis-
ter of war was the need for more troops. When it became apparent that 
troops would not be sent simply for a threatened Texan invasion, 
Armijo resorted to forwarding reports of revolutionaries in the de-
partment and of Indian attacks in the surrounding areas. In July 
1840, Armijo reported that he had just concluded an unfavorable treaty 
with the Navajos because he could not make war against them with so 
10 few troops. In another letter, dated July 12, Armijo reported that 
only the priests could be trusted to be patriotic. 11 Although there 
doubtless was dissatisfaction in New Mexico during this time, Armijo's 
contention that the populace was ready to rebel is not substantiated 
by other documents for that year. A better explanation might be that 
8Ibid., June 12, 1840. 




to minister of war, Santa Fe, July 31, 1840, MANM. 
July 12, 1840. 
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the governor needed troops and was using all possible methods for ob-
taining them. At worst the inhabitants were apathetic about the 
situation, not rebellious. 
In reality, the troops under Annijo's corrnnand were not in good 
condition. The main presidio in Santa Fe could list but 107 men in 
March 1840, and the militia was in worse shape. Records show that 
many men who on paper were in the militia actually did not serve. 
Within the jurisdiction of Santa Fe, the muster rolls show 526 men as 
part of; the militia. Of this number only thirty-four were categorized 
as con armas !:!! ~ (with anns in hand). This condition was the rule 
for other jurisdictions such as San Juan, Rio Abajo, Albuquerque, and 
Cochiti. Although the anny appeared quite powerful on paper, it had 
12 little actual strength. 
Contributing to the poor condition of the military was the paucity 
of supplies and poor equipment. After Mexican independence, the 
Spanish system for supplying the troops had been maintained. With 
payment of troops one month to one year behind schedule, scant finan-· 
cial assistance from Mexico City, and inadequate training of the 
soldiers, it was a wonder that the troops performed as well as they 
did. 13 Complicating effective armament of the troops was the arrange-
ment by which the soldiers had to maintain their equipment at their 
own expense. Armijo tried to maintain good armament through frequent 
inspections, but the condition of the troops was not improved. 14 A 
12M'l' d C d f 1840 S F MANM 1. 1.tary an ompany recor s or , anta e, • 
13sidney B. Brinckerhoff, and Odie B. Faulk, Lancers :f;or the King 
(Phoenix: Arizona Historical Foundation, 1965). 
14Military Orders of Armijo, Santa Fe, July 14, 1841, MANM. 
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typical reply from the minister of war to Armijo concerning payment of 
troops was that sufficient funds had been provided, and he was to fight 
the barbarians and to make do with what he had. 15 The minister -of war 
must have become somewhat piqued at Armijo's constant requests, for the 
following day he wro.te that if Armijo initiated less correspondence, 
thus saving paper, it would be a considerable financial saving to the 
16 
govermnent. 
Losing hope of receiving assistance from Mexico City, yet con-
tinually obtaining reports concerning the Texan invasion, Armijo was· 
forced to rally his people to the defense of the country. In a procla-
mation on July 16, 1840, the governor warned the citizens of an ap-
proaching invasion by Texan rebels. He asked if the people were 
willing to be reduced to slaves, if they would allow the destruction 
of the religion, and if they would fight for their beloved country. 
In order to preserve the peace he issued the following orders: 
1. Any man over sixteen years of age, upon hearing news 
of an attack on the departmental frontiers is 
immediately ordered to report to the nearest political 
ormilitary authority with his arms. 
2. No person will leave the department for the area held 
by the enemy for any reason whatsoever. 
3. No person is to supply the enemy with articles of war 
or give any form of aid to them. 
4. Foreigners that are naturalized citizens have the 
same obligations as the Mexicans of natural birth. 
Foreigners not naturalized will observe complete 
neutrality. 
5. Those persons that fail to observe these declared 
ordinances of the law will be tunished unpardonably 
to the full extent of the law. 7 
15Minister of war to Armijo, Mexico, October 30, 1839, MANM. 
16rbid., October 31, 1839. 
17Proclamation of Armijo, Santa Fe, July 16, 1840, MANM. 
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The governor's tone in this proclamation was both patriotic and 
forceful. He could not fight a war without support from his country-
men, and it was his duty as governor and commandant general to rally 
the people to the defense of New Mexico. 
With the passing of September 1840, Armijo realized that the 
Texans would not arrive that year, yet he became more convinced that 
Texan conspirators were already in New Mexico. During October 1840, 
a plot to assassinate Armijo was discovered in Santa Fe. Nothing of 
.,.- ,, / 
substance was proved in the trial of Julian Garcia and Tomas Valencia 
except that they strongly disliked the policies of Armijo and wanted 
to kill him, Judging from the questions that the civil authorities 
asked these two men, however, it appears that the court thought the 
men were in the service of Texas. Yet nothing was proved except their 
· 1 18 gu1. t. 
In the early months of 1841, Armijo continued his efforts to 
strengthen his troops and to organize the militia in the department. 
Recent reports from the Comanche Indians, which told of having seen 
the Texans, indicated that the tejanos would arrive in Santa Fe that 
fall. These reports caused great alarm to Armijo, who feared that 
the Texans would make an alliance with the Comanches against the 
Mexicans. On June 3, Armijo notified the minister of war that he 
needed troops and ammunition, hinting that the chance of a Comanche-
Texan alliance was now a definite possibility. 19 By this time the 
minister of war had received similar reports of a Texan invasion from 
18p d' · J 1 '.;, G /' d T / V 1 . S t F recee 1.ngs against u 1.an arc1.a an omas a enc1.a, an a e, 
October 17, 1840, MANM. 
19Armijo to minister of war, Santa .Fe, June 3, 1841, MANM. 
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other sources, and he promised help to Annijo. 
Orders came from Mexico City telling Armijo not to abandon New 
Mexico, but to defend it at all costs. More important, troops and 
money would be sent to the governor to be used as he saw fit. Finally, 
a well-organized plan of defense against the Texans was established 
/ 
between Armijo, the minister of war, and Garcia Conde, Governor of 
Chihuahua. 20 Armijo would maintain his forces along the Eastern 
frontier, guarding against Indian unrest and advance parties from 
Texas. Conde would bring fresh troops and anununition as soon as 
possible. The minister of war finished his letter by writing that it 
would be best to meet the Texans before they entered any populated 
areas inasmuch as the patriotism of the people was still unknown. 
Above all, Armijo was not to enter into any relations or agreements 
'h h T b 1 b b ' h' · d' d 21 wit t e exan re es ut was too taint eir imme iate surren er. 
While authorities organized policy outside the department, Armijo 
was not idle in establishing a plan within New Mexico. Trusted 
friends and officials were given specific duties: Antonio Sandoval 
was to watch for Indian trouble in the North, Vicar Juan Ortiz was 
/ 
to arouse public spirit in support of the government, Mariano Chavez 
was ordered to conunand the militia in Santa Fe, and scouting parties 
under Damasio Salazar and Santiago Ulivarri were to guard the Eastern 
frontier. In addition, one hundred pesos were offered to any person 
supplying definite information about the location .of the Texans. 22 
ZOS A A ' · M ' J 1 12 1841 MANM anta nna to rmiJo, exico, u y , , • 
21Minister of war to Annijo, Mexico, July 12, 1841, MANM. 
22Armijo to Conde, Santa Fe, September 22, 1841, MANM. 
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Further complications developed when reports came to Armijo im-
pugning the loyalty of two of the governor's most trusted militia 
captains, Juan Andres Archuleta and Felipe Sena. On August 5, these 
two men were investigated for having knowledge of the enemy. The 
episode was quite distressing for Armijo because Archuleta was second 
in command of the departmental armies. Nonetheless, the proceedings 
were conducted, with both de'fendants denying having any connection 
with the Texans or knowledge of their location. 
N 
Archuleta and Sena 
were exonerated from the charge, and Archuleta was sent to Taos to 
d h ·1· . 23 comman t e mi itia. 
Many foreigners in Santa Fe were concerned for their lives and 
property in the event of an actual battle. Manuel Alvarez, consul for 
the United States, was the acknowledged spokesman for these interests. 
In a letter to the governor dated September 14, Alvarez demanded that 
foreigners in New Mexico be treated as neutrals and that their property 
24 
b~ respected. Armijo replied, "Citizens of countries friendly to 
Mexico will be protected and respected conforming to treaties in 
25 effect." However, when Armijo left the capital to fight the Texans 
on September 16, some irate Mexicans entered the Alvarez home and gave 
him a severe beating. Upon hearing o'f this disturbance, the secretary 
to the governor, Guadalupe Miranda, dispersed the rabble--which only 
six months previously had been termed by Dryden as strongly pro-
23p d. . rocee ings against Juan Andre's Archuleta and Felipe Se'¥ia, 
Santa Fe, August. 5, 1841, MANM. 
24Al A .. varez to rmiJo, Santa Fe, September 12, 1841, MANM. 
25A .. rmiJO to Alvarez, Santa Fe, September 12, 1841, MANM. 
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American--and apologized to Alvarez. 26 
By September 1841, Armijo was ready for the arrival of the Texans. 
Citizens and spies were on constant watch for the invaders, the militia 
had been organized in Taos under Juan Archuleta, and on September 16 
Antonio Sandoval was called to Santa Fe to act as head of state while 
Armijo led his forces to San Miguel. While Armijo was well-prepared 
for battle, the Texans were not as they approached Santa Fe. Half-
starved, ragged, and weak, the Texans were in no shape to fight a war. 
Due to the weak condition of many of the men in the expedition, 
Colonel McLeod decided on August 30 at Camp Resolution to divide the 
conunand: 
However impolitic it may be considered to divide a conunand, 
in this instance such a course could not be avoided. We 
were completely lost, and without power of moving forward; 
our provisions ••• were now almost entirely exhausted, 
with only poor beef enough each day to support nature; and 
in addition we were surrounded by a large and powerful tribe 
of well-mounted Indians.27 
Captain William Cooke, with approximately one hundred men, was to 
march ahead to San Miguel with the best animals and strongest men, 
carrying provisions only for five days. Colonel McLeod would remain 
behind with the remainder of the conunand and would continue as best 
he could. The five-day journey to San Miguel was in reality a two-
week battle against starvation and Indians for Captain Cooke. 
On September 16, an advance party of five Texans, including 
Kendall, were captured by Captain Damasio Salazar and his conunand of 
sixty-eight men. Salazar later reported that upon meeting the Texans 
26 Miranda to Alvarez, Santa Fe, September 17', 1841, MANM. 
27 Kendall, Narrative, p. 279. 
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he told them that they could not enter the department without first 
removing their arms. After some consultation the Texans complied. 
Two of the captives, probably George Kendall and William Lewis, de-
mantled to see the governor, but Salazar informed them that this could 
not presently be arranged. After conferring with his officers, Salazar 
decided that the Texans were spies and as such should be executed. Had 
not Gregorio Vigil interceded and said that only Governor Armijo had the 
authority to execute prisoners, all five Texans undoubtedly would have 
been shot. 28 Kendall's version of this incident is similar once the 
29 personal slurs are removed. He does exaggerate the :strength of Sala-
zar's force, which he places at over one hundred, and he also wrote 
30 
that Salazar was unable to read. This was impossible, for Salazar 
wrote reports concerning the affair to Armijo. Both men do agree, 
however, that the five Texans were sent to San Miguel as captives. 
While these five Texans were being marched to San Miguel, Armijo 
passed them going in the opposite direction. He paused long enough 
to express his need for an interpreter. At this point William Lewis 
stepped forward and proceeded with Armijo to meet the Texans. On 
September 17, Salazar and Lewis located the remainder of the Cooke 
party at Anton Chico. Lewis told Captain Cooke that it would be futile 
to fight because Armijo was only twelve hours distant with three 
thousand men. After Lewis pledged his Masonic word of honor that the 
men would not be taken as prisoners, that they would receive food, and 
28oiary of Damasio Salazar, September 11-15, 1841 (Pasadena: 
The William G. Ritch Collection, The Huntington Library). 
29 
Kendall, Narrative, p. 377. 
301bid., P• 379. 
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that the Texans would be well-treated, Cooke ordered his men to lay 
down their arms. The Texans were irrnnediately tied up and their prop-
erty confiscated. The next morning Armijo arrived with fifteen 
hundred men and held a council of war to decide the fate of the invad-
ers. Franklin Combs, one of the captives, later stated that only by the 
vote of one member of the council was it decided not to execute the 
prisoners. Within the next week the Cooke portion of the expedition 
h db · 1 d. h M · c· 31 a egun its ong, te ious mare to exico ity. 
After the capture of this first party of Texans, Armijo made 
his headquarters at Las Vegas and organized his strategy for the 
capture of the McLeod party, still out on the prairie. Colonel Juan 
/ 
Andres Archuleta was sent to search for the Texans, who were encount-
ered on October 4 at Laguna Colorada. Archuleta demanded their 
irrnnediate surrender; McLeod replied that he would give his answer at 
9:00 the next day. Archuleta was well entrenched around the Texans, 
an?:: during the night he was reinforced with sixty rurales, bringing 
·. his total strength to 233. The new troops were sent behind the Texans, 
thus surrounding the;rn completely. With little choice, McLeod,therefore 
surrendered his corrnnand of 175 weak, starved, and scurvy-ridden men. 
On October 6, .Archuleta took the cannon and arms of the captives, and 
on the seventh these Texans. likewise began their long march to Mexico 
C • 32 ity. 
The capture of the Texans gave great prestige to Governor Armijo. 
31 
Combs, "Combs' Narrative of the Santa Fe Expedition in 1841," 
307-9. 
32niary of Juan Andres Archuleta, September 30-0ctober 9, 1841, 
MANM. 
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In public celebrations throughout New Mexico, proclamations carried 
by the Texans offering annexation to the New Mexicans were burned. 
In a proclamation to the inhabitants of the department, Armijo saluted 
and congratulated them for their success in defeating the Texan 
bandits: 
You hesitated not one moment in taking arms when the 
country called you to its defense •••• The enemies 
of our national integrity, that today by some mistake 
occupy the fertile territory of Texas, and that tried 
to extend from there the limits of that territory •• 
• , have met with the intrepid and bellicose nature 
of the New Mexicans. Be assured that with the perser-
verance and valor that you have given our nation, no 33 
enemy will accomplish such depraved plots as this •••• 
While the Texans were being marched some two thousand miles to Mexico 
C. t th t d h d h O • 0 34 A · 0 i i y, ere o en ure severe ar sips in prison, rmiJo was rece v-
ing the praise of the federal government for a job well done. 
Manuel Armijo viewed the Texans as enemies of the Mexican nation 
and responded accordingly. To conclude that the Mexican government 
had any other policy toward Texas at this time is unrealistic. During 
this period, circulars were issued by the Mexican government to the 
diplomatic corps in Mexico City reminding them that a state of war was 
in existence between Texas and Mexico, thereby showing that Texan inde-
d . d 35 pen ence was not recognize. While apologists for the Texan Santa Fe 
expedition argue that New Mexico was part of Texas because of the 
33Proclamation of Armijo, Santa Fe, November 10, 1841, MANM. 
34For diplomatic correspondence concerning the Texan prisoners 
while in Mexico see United States Senate Document No. 325, 27th 
Cong., 2nd Sess., Serial No. 398. 
35Circular to diplomatic Corps from Mexican minister of foreign 
affairs, in Waddy Thompson, Recollections of Mexico (New York: Wiley 
and Putnam, 1846), pp. 285-6. 
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Treaty of Velasco, no such belief was entertained by the Mexicans. The 
policy of Mexico toward Texas was one of war. Thus, Annijo considered 
the Texans as an invading anny and dealt with them as such. 
The complete failure of the Santa Fe expedition in 1841 did not 
end further talk in the Lone Star Republic of expansionistic expe-
ditions. Once the captives of the expedition began returning to Texas 
in 1842, plans immediately were initiated to retaliate against the 
Mexicans. The so-called treachery of Armijo, Salazar~ and Lewis de-
mantled action by the Texans. On January 28, 1843, Jacob Snively pe-
titioned the Texan government for pennission to organize an expedition 
to plunder Mexican traders from Santa Fe. His commission was granted 
on February 16, and read in part~ 
Your communication of the 28th ulto. soliciting per-
mission from the government to organize and fit out an 
expedition for the purpose of intercepting and capturing 
the property of the Mexican traders who may pass through 
the territory of the Republic to and from Santa Fe, &c. 
has been received and laid before his excellency, the 
President: and he, after a careful consideration of the 
subject, directs that such authority be granted you upon 
the tenns and conditions therein expressed--. 
These conditions were: the force should not exceed three hundred 
men, the republic would receive one half of all spoils, and the force 
was to operate only within the territory of Texas--as defined by the 
36 Treaty of Velasco. As with the expedition of 1841, no attempt at 
secrecy was made, and travelers and newspapers carried news of the 
planned attack to New Mexico. 
Fear of another Texan invasion was evident in New Mexico during 
36commission of Jacob Snively, February 16, 1843, in William E. 
Connelley, ed., "A Journal of the Santa Fe Trail," Mississippi Valley 
Historical Review, XII (September, 1925), 228-9. 
1842-1843. Exaggerated accounts of Texans coming across the prairie, 
as early as 1842, increased this fear. With the approach of the 
winter of 1842 and no appearance of Texans, Armijo suspected that 
47 
the ,expedition would not arrive during that year. Nonetheless, troops 
were held in readiness, and the commandant general in Chihuahua, 
Francisco Cordero, informed Armijo that three hundred troops could be 
sent to New Mexico at the governor's request. 37 During December 
1842, Armijo received information that the Comanches had attacked and 
turned back some Texans on the Eastern frontier. 38 Further information 
came to Armijo from his brother, Ambrosio, then in New York City, who 
wrote that Texans had recruited men and obtained arms to send yet 
another expedition against New Mexico; the enemy plan would be to rob 
the merchants and possibly to invade Santa Fe. 39 
. By the spring of 1843, New Mexicans were thoroughly alarmed. In 
March, Armijo reported to the higher authorities that eight hundred 
Texans would attack from the southeast and the same number of Americans 
would reinforce the Texans by attacking from the north. Merchants in 
Santa Fe also were alarmed over the possibility of a Texan attack, and 
asked Armijo for protection of their goods along the trade routes. 
The information that Armijo received from the merchants was that 290 
Texans, located along the Arkansas River, were prepared to attack. In 
addition, Armijo was alarmed over the possibility of Indian uprisings 
at the same time. The Mexican pueblo auxiliaries, militia, and 
37cordero to Armijo, Chihuahua, October 31, 1842, MANM. 
38Armijo to Cordero, Santa Fe, December 6, 1842, MANM. 
39Armijo to minister of war, Santa Fe, December 27, 1842, MANM. 
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permanent troops were readied to meet the invasion, while spies were 
h f · . dd" . 1 . f . 40 sent tote rontier to gain a itiona in ormation • 
.,,, \., 
The murder and robbery of Jose Antonio Chavez by John McDaniel and 
a party of Missouri raiders increased the anxiety of the merchants in 
Santa Fe. 
/ . 
Chavez, a wealthy Mexican trader, left Santa Fe in February 
of 1843, with two wagons, fifty-five mules, and ten thousand dollars in 
gold bullion. On April 10 he reached the Little Arkansas River, well 
inside the territory of the United States. At this point he was met 
by McDaniel and fifteen other men professing to be Texans. The band 
had left Missouri planning to join Colonel Charles Warfield, also 
supposedly in the employ of the Texan republic. / Chavez was brutally 
murdered, his goods stolen, and his mules slaughtered. When news of 
this massacre reached Santa Fe, Armijo became concerned lest the next 
41 
caravan be attacked by Texans. 
Without the entry of goods into the department, revenue would not 
be collected. With no revenue, Armijo could not pay his troops or 
carry on the government. That the financial situation was critical 
is evidenced by the actions of the treasurer, Ambrosio Armijo, who had 
/ 
to resort to forced loans from Rio Abajo to supply the treasury. But 
42 by June 1843 only three thousand pesos had been collected. Because 
of this financial crisis in the department, Governor Armijo led an 
expedition to the Arkansas River to guard the traders arriving from 
the United States from attacks by the Texans. If the trade caravan 
40rbid., March 24, 1843. 
41Ambrosio Armijo to Miranda, Santa Fe, June 21, 1843, MANM. 
42Armijo to minister of war, Santa Fe, July 10, 1843, MANM. 
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/ 
was attacked and robbed, as was Chavez', Armijo' s major source of 
government revenue would be lost. 
Armijo charged Colonel Archuleta with the duties of acting-
governor and departed for the Arkansas River. His command included 
loo 1 · h 250 · 1 · . 43 regu ar troops wit auxi iaries. On May 10, Colonel 
Warfield with twenty-five Texans attacked the village of Mora, killing 
some citizens and stealing over one hundred horses. The following day, 
militia from Taos recovered these horses along with those of the Texans, 
forcing the invaders to retreat on foot to Snively's command. Once 
united, the Texans headed toward the Arkansas River with plans of 
defeating Armijo's army and capturing the trade caravan on its way 
44 
to Santa Fe. 
On June 20, the combined forces of Snively and Warfield--some 180 
men--attacked the advance party of Armijo's army, which was led by 
Buenaventura Lovato. His one hundred ill-equipped auxiliaries were 
soundly defeated by the Texans. Lovato and seventeen others were 
k ·11 d d · h k · 45 i e, an eig ty more were ta en prisoner. Meanwhile Armijo was 
certain that a large attack was impending, and his fears were aug-
mented when two Mexicans, recently arrived from the north, stated that 
four hundred men at Bent's Fort were about to attack. Not only were 
these men to attack the caravan, but also they were to attack Santa 
Fe.46 
43Armijo to minister of war, Santa Fe, July 10, 1843, MANM. 
44 
Bancroft, History, pp. 327-8. 
45H. Bailey Carroll, "Steward A. Miller and the Snively Expedition 
of 1843," Southwestern Historical Quarterly, Vol. LIV (January, 1951), 
281-2. 
46 Records of Alcalde Primero, Antonio Sena, Santa Fe, May 19, 
1843, MANM. 
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While Armijo worried over false reports such as this, the Texans 
encountered problems of their own. Hugh Young, a member of the expe-
dition, recorded that on June 28, Captain William Chandler reported to 
Snively that many of the men desired to return to Texas. Snively or-
dered Chandler to :make a list ·of the malcotit-ents .. atldt)to'f.t'ake/,:t:hem home. 
"Seventy men left us. We now numbered one hundred four," he wrote. 
Two days later Captain Philip St. George Cooke of the United States 
Army crossed into Texan territory and disarmed the Texans, although 
he did allow them to return to Independence with his command. Thirty 
Texans joined Captain Cooke while the remainder of the Texans under 
Warfield and Snively eventually returned to Austin after some skir-
mishing between the two for command. Although the Texan threat was 
now ended, Armijo had no knowledge of these actions. 47 
Through the months of June and July, Armijo still feared a Texan 
attack. By July 4, the governor had returned to Santa Fe abandoning 
the expected caravan for fear of attacks on Santa Fe. Conditions in 
Santa Fe were not improving, the army was two months in salary arrears, 
48 
and morale was extremely low. Armijo wrote the authorities at 
Mexico City to ask for ten thousand pesos in addition to supplies of 
ammunition and food. Further assistance was requested of members of 
Armijo's family in the form of loans, but little income resulted. 49 
In this atmosphere of pressing financial need, the first group of 
47 Stephan B. Oates, ed., "Hugh F. Young's Account of the Snively 
Expedition As Told to John S. Ford," Southwestern Historical Quarterly, 
Vol. LXX (July, 1966), 71-92. 
48 Archuleta to Armijo, Santa Fe, July 13, 1843, MANM. 
49Armijo to minister of war, Santa Fe, July 10, 1843,.MANM. 
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traders arrived in Santa Fe on July 27. On August 9, troops under 
the conunand of General Monterde, recently promoted to commander of all 
troops in the northern sector, arrived in Santa Fe. This promotion 
placed Armijo second in conunand. However, the troops stayed only one 
50 
day, then returned to El Paso. 
By August Armijo was certain that the Texan danger had passed. 
Caravans continued into Santa Fe, bringing with them news that the 
Texans had been disarmed by Cooke and that the trail was safe. The 
second Texan expedition did accomplish part of its purposej however, 
After the arrival of General Monterde, many complaints were lodged 
against Armijo for failing ad~quately to defend the department. In 
October 1843, General Monterde removed Armijo from the position of 
/ conunandant general, replacing him with Colonel Mariano Martinez of 
Chihuahua. Then in January 1844, Armijo gave control of the depart-
mental government to Mariano Chfvez. Armijo stated at that time that 
his position had become unbearable because he had been ill for the 
preceding two months: "It is impossible [for me] to continue in 
51 
charge of the government in this department." 
Acting Governor Chavez resigned on April 10, 1844, to be succeeded 
., 
by Conunandant General Mariano Martinez, who now headed both offices of 
governor and commandant general. With arrival of Martinez came 
vigorous policies for the Department of New Mexico. Throughout 1844 
a plan for a military expedition against the Texans was being formu-
lated by leaders in Mexico City. Instead of defending the department, 
50Minister of war to Armijo, Mexico, July 19, 1843, MANM. 
51Arm~J·o to m~n~ster ff O ff O S t F J 15 L LL o oreign a airs, arr a e, anuary , 
1844, MANM. 
52 
the citizens would mount a full offensive campaign against the Texans. 
Mexican President Valenti' Canalizo had strong hopes of restoring the 
Department of Texas to Mexico, and by May of 1844 he had begun to 
52 
organize an army by soliciting troops from the various departments. 
After the inauguration of Santa Anna as president on June 10~ 
1844, General Canalizo was made chief of staff of the army yet to be 
raised. Although New Mexico was exempted from the draft calls because 
of its burden of frontier defense, Martiriez was enthusiastic about the 
proposed Texan campaign. He acknowledged to Canalizo that the Depart= 
ment of New Mexico was ideally situated to launch an attack, and sent 
information concerning the area and probable troop strength of the 
53 Texans to the general. Foreigners believed that such an attack would 
be unlikely, however, and true enough the entire campaign began to bog 
down in Mexico because of internal squabbles and a shortage of money 
54 
to finance such an undertaking. 
While political problems plagued the government in Mexico, daily 
/ 
problems such as Indian depradations caused Martinez to reconsider his 
role in this military campaign against Texas. During the late summer 
and early fall of 1844, the Utes in New Mexico once again broke the 
peace treaties by raiding into Abiquiu. 
_. 
While Martinez was fighting 
the Utes, new instructions came to him calling for launching the Texan 
campaign in the spring of 1845. Martfuez was asked to raise and equip 
52Decree of Canalizo, Mexico, May 13, 1844, MANM. 
53Marti~ez to Chief of Staff, August 5, 1844, Santa Fe, MANM. 
54George Lockhart Rives, The United States and Mexico, 1821-1848, 
Vol. I (New York: Scribner's """""s;ns, 1913), pp. 660-3. 
53 
two hundred troops for the expedition, using only the best troops, 
d . 55 mounts, an equipment. 
,/ 
By November 15, Martinez was forced to write the commanding gener-
al of the Mexican Army that owing to the recent Indian wars in the de-
1 
' 
1 partment of New Mexico, he would be unable to participate in the Texan 
campaign. He stated that there scarcely were enough troops and equip-
ment to defend his own frontier, let along supply two hundred men to 
fight for the Mexican Army. 56 In reality, Marti~ez' withdrawal from the 
campaign had little effect. In December, Santa Anna was banished from 
, 
Mexico, and a new administration under President Joaquin de Herrera 
was formed. .With this change of government c~me the collapse of the 
proposed Texan campaign, and while the politicians fought among 
/ 57 
themselves in Mexico City, Martinez attempted to control the Indians. 
55 General Ur:i:-ea of the Mexican Army to Martinez, Hermosilla, 
September 9, 1844, MANM. 
56 -"" Martinez to Urrea, Santa Fe, November 15, 1844, MANM. 




Indian problems for Martinez were, for the most part, similar 
to those encountered by Armijo. Both governors attempted to induce 
the Indians to live peacefully by two basic methodsg war and concilia-
tion. These policies were doomed from the start, however, because 
neither effective warfare nor adequate conciliation could be financed. 
Letters from the governors to central authorities pleaded for more 
funds and stressed the fact that they were surrounded by more than 
thirty hostile Indian tribes, outnumbered two to one, and had few 
supplies to maintain an effective fighting force. 1 To suppose that ,, 
only Armijo and Martinez had ideas concerning the best way to handle 
the hostile Indians is incorrect; it appears rather that there 
was no shortage of ideas on this subject. 
Until the creation of the comm.andancy generalship in New Mexico, 
the department was under the authority of Chihuahua. This situation 
had some benefits for the departments. Generally, both Chihuahua and 
New Mexico were faced with similar problems, if not identical tribes 
of enemies. Combined campaigns would be organized between the two 
departments that were more effective in dealing with the hostile Indi-· 
ans. Once this policy was changed in 1839, each department went its 




own way, causing greater confusion for all concerned. New Mexicans 
enjoyed a quasi-peace with the Comanches and were allowed to trade 
with them, supposedly under governmental regulations. After obtaining 
goods and weapons from the New Mexicans, the Comanches would proceed 
down their war trails to Chihuahua, burning homes, stealing livestock, 
and murdering farmers. This situation was a bitter pill for the 
Chihuahuans to swallow, and it explains their lackadaisical attitude 
in sending help to New Mexicans when they, in turn, were being ram-
paged by other tribes. In 1844 a large Comanche war party gathered 
around Santa Fe to wait for trade to begin. 
/ 
Martinez was placed in a 
ticklish situation; either he traded or he would be attacked. Moral 
problems of this sort do not appear to have bothered Armijo, but 
.,,,, 
Martinez sent a letter to Chihuahua after concluding the trade inform-
ing Chihuahuan officials that the Comanches would be leaving with the 
next full moon. Situations 'such as this did little to improve inter-
2 departmental harmony. 
The central government had suggestions for the frontier depart-
ments regarding ways to improve local conditions. Similar to most 
policies of the government at this time, these suggestions placed less 
responsibility for the departmental unkeep on the national authorities 
while increasing that of the department. Indian problems could be 
lessened if the departments of Chihuahua and New Mexico would reach an 
agreement for combining policies and sharing the expenses, said 
officials in Mexico City. In this way, matters could be channeled 
directly between them, leaving the central government free to solve 
2Martinez to conmandant general of Chihuahua, Santa Fe, July 31, 
1844, MANM. 
other more important problems. Predictably, the departments failed 
3 to come to any agreement. In addition, Mexican authorities advised 
56 
the conunandants general to try different tactics to subdue the hostile 
Indians. Because of increased colonization of the provinces, Indians 
had less room to fish and hunt., causing them to scorn civilization 
even more. Because the Indians would not learn of their own volition 
the ways of civilization, departmental soldiers should show the Indians 
how to work and reside peacefully within society; prisoners that were 
taken were to be taught how to read and write. The plan looked good 
on paper, but it did not fit conditions in New Mexico. 4 
All were in agreement that the Indians must be civilized. The 
outspoken Padre Jos~ Antonio Martinez wrote from Taos in 1843 that 
it was a true and notorious fact that the hostile Indians of New 
Mexico and neighboring departments lived by robbery and theivery; 
the result was that fields were uncultivated and huge tracts of land 
previously under irrigation were now deserted. The time that the 
Indians employed in raids was necessarily lost to labor, causing the 
uncultivated fields not to produce enough food for their ma.intenance. 
In addition, various species of deer and other game, which formerly 
roamed the province in great quantity, had diminished. Buffalo had 
almost disappeared throughout the d~partment where at first they were 
thought to be inexhaustible. This condition forced the Indians to 
travel for two months to get meat which was generally of bad taste 
and quality. With a shortage of buffalo the Indians were obliged to 
3Ibid., December 16, 1844. 
4circular to commandant generals in New Mexico, Chihuahua, 




resort to pillage and robbery. Martinez concluded by writing that 
there was no other way for peace to come to the department except to 
induce the Indian tribes to live in civilized society by cultivating 
the land, undertaking various industries, and raising cattle. Although 
the padre's goals were excellent, the means he suggested for accomplish-
5 ing them were vague and unclear. 
While the debate concerning the proper method to pursue in 
civilizing the Indians continued, citizens were attempting to defend 
their homes from Indian attacks. Vigil wrote that the greater portion 
of New Mexicans, particularly those most exposed to the attack of the 
savages, were armed only with bows and arrows because of the scarcity 
of firearms and ammunition. Yet the introduction of arms and ammuni-
tion into New Mexico was prohibited by the. Mexican government. The 
result was that only a few of the wealthier citizens had such equip-
ment. Vigil stated that if arms and arrnnunition could be supplied to 
New Mexicans, there would be fewer problems with the Indians. 6 
Not all the Indians in New Mexico were hostile, however. On the 
contrary, many peaceful Indian pueblos dotted the New Mexican land= 
scape. The number of inhabited pueblos in the department was approxi= 
mately twenty-five. Some of the better known pueblos were San Juan, 
Taos, Santa Clara, Isleta, Cochiti, Jemez, Acoma, and Laguna. In 
addition. to these settlements, located mainly along the Rfo Arriba, 
there were some Moqui (Hopi) pueblos in the extreme western portion 
of the department. When the Indians in these pueblos became inde-
5 / J. A. Martinez to Santa Anna, Taos, 1843, in Keleher, Turmoil, 
pp. 68- 71. 
6vigil, May 16, 1846, Ritch Collection. 
pendent, their life continued without perceptible change; they con-
tinued to raise stock, farm, and hunt in order to meet their daily 
requirements. Although officially listed as Mexican citizens, most 
of the pueblo inhabitants were too ignorant and poverty ridden to 
understand the meaning of the word citizen. 7 
58 
The way of life in the Indian pueblos undoubtedly exemplified the 
~ policies that Armijo and Martinez hoped to apply to all Indians. In 
1837 the departmental assembly reorganized the department into two 
districts of pueblos. The first district included the alcaldi~s of 
Santa Fe, Canada, Abiquiu, San Juan, and Taos. Within the second 
district were placed Cochiti, Jeni'ez, Isleta, Laguna, and Socorro. 
Each district had further subdivisions, but in practice the alcalde 
of each village was the nominal head of governmental affairs. The 
alcalde supervised all civil and military matters within his given 
area, with but little assistant from the juez, or Justice. Thus, as 
in Mexican villages, the alcaldes and jueces, both .of whom were.· 
appointed by the governor, were responsible for law and order. While 
these officials were appointed to serve the government, documents show 
that their positions in the pueblos were seen largely by their occu-
8 
pants as a means of making money at the pueblo's expense. 
Because the Indians living in the pueblos were citizens of New 
Mexico, they were expected to support the military expeditions against 
hostile Indians. In order to insure that all possible Indians might 
serve, they were required to join militia units organized throughout 
7 
Bloom, "New Mexico under Mexican Administration," Vol. II, 25. 
8Minutes of the departmental assembly, panta Fe, May 22, 1837, 
~~. I 
the department. The local justices were charged with locating as 
many men as necessary to defend the village or to go on expeditions 
against warring tribes. The usual result was that all men above the 
age of sixteen were listed as the town militia regardless of their 
I 
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capacity to serve. 9 For the most part, the pueblos were very aggres= 
sive in helping the authorities against hostile Indians or foreign 
invaders although the pueblos of Acoma, Laguna, and Zuni on at least 
one occasion refused to support the Mexicans against the Navajos. lO 
Armijo attempted to keep peace in the pueblos by compensating the 
inhabitants for losses incurred by hostile Indians. He was well aware 
that if the pueblos revolted and joined forces with the hostile 
Indians, New Mexicans would have little chance of defending themselves. 
One popular method used by Armijo was to give clothing to replace 
animals that had been stolen from pueblo Indians. In 1839 an Indian 
from Jeriez received thirty-six yards of cotton for a mule that had been 
stolen, and two Indians from Laguna received twenty-nine yards of 
cotton and a bag of sugar for a horse that was captured by the Nava-
jos.11 Interaction between the government and the outlying pueblos 
was limited usually to expeditions against unfriendly Indians when 
troops were out on the frontier. When these outlying Indians did come 
to Santa Fe, Annijo usually made an effort to give them gifts and 
12 
food. 
9Military survey, Santa Fe, March, 1839, MANM. 
10 / 
Julian Tenorio to the governor, Albuquerque, September 3, 
183.7, MANM. 
11sargeant Antonio Se~a, Cuaderno Manual, Entry for October, 
1839, MANM. 
12rbid., October, 1840. 
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/ Governor Martinez also attempted to keep good relations with the 
pueblos. His attitude toward these Indians was very different than 
that usually expressed by other departmental officials. In 1844 the 
governor received a report from the alcalde at Cochiti that the Indians 
were conducting pagan dances that were sinful to all decent New Mexi-
cans. In addition, the alcalde told Marti'iiez that a strange object 
had been found, one that appeared to be some form of graven image. 13 
Marti{ez replied that the alcalde should respect the customs of the 
Indians and not insult their religion. Only through friendship and 
14 
understanding would the Indians be made civilized, not. by force. 
/ Not all Mexican officials were as open-minded as Martinez 9 how-
ever, and more important not all Indians were of a similar, peaceful 
temperament. When hostile Indians went on the warpath, the New Mexi-
can government would mount expeditions to regain the plunder and 
attack the renegades, but for the most part, their policy was one of 
retaliation. Armijo was raised in this environment of attack and 
counter-attack, so it was not without grounds that he sometimes disa-
greed with authorities in Mexico City on Indian policy. During his 
administration of 1837-1843 he was acknowledged by the central govern-
ment as the region's foremost leader in Indian affairs by a promotion 
15 to brigadier general. Throughout these years four tribes were most 
bothersome to New Mexicans: Apaches, Comanches, Navajos, and Utes. 
13Alcalde of Cochiti to Marti~ez, Cochiti, June 1, 1844, MANM. 
14 .,.. 
Martinez to alcalde of Cochiti, Santa Fe, June 1, 1844, MANM. 
lSA · f A . . b . d. 1 b P "d ppo1.ntment o rm1.Jo to riga 1.er genera y resi ent Busta-
mente, Mexico, October 1, 1840, MANM. 
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The Comanches enjoyed a privileged status in the Department of 
61 
New Mexico. Except for occasional raids that were ignored by officials, 
they generally remained at peace in New Mexico although they carried on 
an incessant war against residents of Chihuahua, Durango, and Coahuila, 
from whom they captured large herds of horses and enslaved large 
numbers of whites. Regarding the Comanches, Annijo was at complete 
odds with the central government, which wanted their maraudings 
stopped and which criticized Armijo for not making war on the savages. 
Matters worsened for Armijo in 1841 when he was ordered to engage the 
Comanches in battle throughout New Mexico, while Chihuahuan officials 
16Bent to Medill, Santa Fe, November 10, 1846, in United States 
Senate Documents No.~, 31st Cong., 1st Sess., Serial No. 557. 
17 
conducted an expedition against them from the south. 
Armijo was caught once again between actual frontier conditions 
and the policies set forth by the central government. He explained 
62 
his position to the minister of war in a letter on March 31, 1841. He 
wrote that the department had a peace treaty with the· Comanches which 
had endured for many years, and to break it would mean instant ruin; 
yet the order from the government stood. Not trusting his own judg-
ment in a matter of such great importance as this, Armijo consulted 
with all the respected and knowledgable officials in the department. 
This council declined to wage war against the Comanches. Armijo 
justified this position by adding that New Mexicans conducted constant 
war against the barbarians that plagued them; thus, they were already 
in active service. Furthermore, if war began against the Comanches, 
the department would be devastated, people killed,: and lives.tock 
stolen. New Mexicans could not afford to fight these terrible 
warriors when they were at this moment losing battles to the Apaches, 
18 
Navajos, and Utes. 
While Armijo waited for a response to this letter, licenses were 
issued to New Mexicans to trade with the Comanches. Armijo under-
stood this trade to be limited to wheat, biscuits, bridles, blankets, 
sugar, and foodstuffs in exchange for animals, buffalo, and deer. 
Despite the uneasiness in the department created by the refusal of the 
New Mexicans to make war on the Comanches, affairs with these Indians 
continued as always. Not until 1842 was there an official reply to 
l 7A .. rml.JO to minister of war, Santa Fe, March 31, 1841, MANM. 
18Ibid. 
the governor; it stated that Annijo's policies were understood and 
that if help was needed in refuting either Indians or Texans, 
· ld b . 19 assistance wou e given. Other portions of Mexico continued to 
be attacked by the Comanches, but Armijo remained certain that a 
policy of conciliation would be best for his department. In 1845 
Armijo gave gifts to the Comanches, permitted the citizens to trade 
with them, and even returned some of their prisoners to therrt. 20 
For New Mexicans, conciliation was most effective concerning the 
Comanches; unfortunately, the other Indians were not so easily 
handled. 
63 
Only the Comanches were somewhat controlled by New Mexicans. The 
Apaches also were.warlike, and, according to Charles Bent, lived 
principally by robbing New Mexicans and by plundering the settlements 
and carrying off incredible amounts of stock. He reported that ap-
proximately six thousand Apaches were located in New Mexico mainly 
between the Rfo del Norte and the Gila. 21 Armijo believed that the 
best method for controlling these Indians would be by regulating 
commerce with them, hopefully making them dependent on the New Mexi-
can government for survival. Apparently he was unable to control 
commerce, for by May of 1839 complete trade restrictions against the 
Apaches were instituted. New Mexicans were threatened with a fine of 
fifty pesos if caught trading with them. Contributing to the Apache 
19 General of the Northern Army to Armijo, Matamoros, July 4, 
1842, MANM. 
20Annijo to prefect of Santa Fe, Santa Fe, October 30, 1845, MANM. 
21Bent to Medill, Sant.a Fe, November 10, 1846, in United States 
Senate Documents, No. 18, 31st Cong., 1st Sess., Serial No. 557. 
problem during this period were several bands of renegade Apaches, 
such as the Mescaleros and Lipans. A~~ith some other tribes, there 
22 was no one chief of all Apaches. 
Armijo believed that by disallowing trade with the Apaches they 
would be forced to make peace with the govermnent. By June 1842 the 
Mescaleros initiated efforts for peace ceremonies when two Indian 
chiefs approached Captain Salazar. Armijo signed treaties with these 
Indians and then sent the two on to Chihuahua where more treaties 
23 would be made. Although the provisions of these agreements were· 
advantageous for New Mexico, it was improbable that .. they would be 
64 
honored. The mescaleros were to receive five thousand pesos annually 
from the central government, captives would be exchanged, and.- informa-
tion as to movement of hostile Indians against New Mexico was to be 
given to officials immediately. Treaties such as this usually we're 
the result of one or two smaller tribes that expected to receive im-
mediate funds for signing, while the officials making them liked to 
24 
believe that the treaty covered all tribes of Apaches. 
In reality, these two tribes, the Apaches and Comanches, were 
only minor irritants for New Mexican officials. In later years the 
U ld b f f G M .I b d . h tes wou e o concern or overnor artinez, ut uring t e 
governorship of Armijo from 1837 to 1843, the Navajos provided the most 
constant difficulties. Although the Navajos were not the most 
22Armijo to prefects of the first and second districts, Santa Fe, 
May 3, 1839, MANM. 
23Armijo to commandant general of Chihuahua, Santa Fe, March 1, 
1842, MANM. 
24Armijo to minister of war, Santa Fe, July 12 (?), 1842, MANM. 
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numerous, they were the most harsh in their dealings with New Mexicans. 
They did cultiv~te fields and also had extensive herds of horses, 
mules, cattle, and sheep. Their most famous product was the close-knit 
blankets that were produced in the.ir villages. These blankets were 
demanded by both Mexicans and Americans alike because of their warmth 
25 and resistance to water. Gregg wrote that these blankets were so 
highly praised by New Mexicans for their fine workmanship and protec-
tion against the elements of nature that some sold for as high as fifty 
26 or sixty dollars each. While their blankets were in great demand 
by New Mexicans, there seems to be few compliments given the Navajos 
for their depradations throughout the department. 
While Armijo was governor, at least four expeditions were launched 
against these savages. His successes were small: two treaties re-
sulted, but both were short-lived. In the fall of 1838 Armijo began 
to organize troops to attack these ·,Indians. Two trus.~ed officials, 
Mariano Chfv.ez and Juan·Andr~ Archuleta, were charged with the duty 
of readying and inspecting the troops for the campaign. Armijo left 
the pueblo of Jemez and met some Navajos near Tres Lagunas. At this 
battle the governor killed eighteen of the enemy, captured fifty-four 
27 
prisoners, and confiscated large quantities of grain and sheep. 
After this successful expedition Armijo offered promises of peace to 
I those Navajos so desiring, telling them.to come to Jemez to make a 
treaty. 
25 Leroy R. Hafen, ed., "The W. M. Boggs Manuscript," The Colorado 
Magazine, Vol. VII (March, 1930), 50. 
26 Gregg, Commerce, p. 189. 
27A .. rm1Jo to , Santa Fe, December 25, 1838, MANM. 
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A treaty was signed there on July 15, 1839, and contained most of 
the conditions that Armijo desired. Both sides gave promises of their 
good faith and agreed to the following conditions; first, peace and 
commerce would be restored between the Navajos and the Departments of 
New Mexico and Chihuahua, as well as with all citizens of the Mexican 
nation; second, any captives held by either the Navajos or New Mexi-
cans were to be returned to their homes; third, the Navajos promised 
not to disturb the order and laws of the department in any way; 
fourth, trade was resumed between the Mexicans and Navajos on the same 
basis on which it existed before the war; fifth, if a Navajo killed a 
Mexican, the tribe was to give up the murderer to the government, and 
if a Mexican killed a Navajo thirty sheep were to be paid as a debt to 
his family; si;xith, the Mexican government would not return escaped 
slaves to the Navajos; seventh, the Navajos were to report any news 
of impending invasions by any other Indian tribe. 28 In addition, 
Armijo naturalized all Navajos making them Mexican citizens, and 
29 
appointed Antonio Sandoval to govern them. 
By September of 1839, the treaty no longer was in effect as Armijo 
ordered the militia to organize for another expedition against the 
Navajos. Citizens were informed that because of recent raids against 
settled areas, the Navajos must be beaten once and for all. 30 The new 
campaign against the savages involved expeditions under the command 
""" / / of Mariano Chavez and Juan Andres Archuleta. Chavez was to lead the 
28 Treaty of Jemez, Jemez, July 15, 1839, MANM. 
29Armijo to Sandoval, Santa Fe, August 9, 1839, MANM. 
30Armijo to Archuleta, Santa Fe, September 24, 1839, MANM. 
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southern expedition to Chelly, where he would unite his command with 
Archuleta. 
Archuleta recorded the events of his expedition in a daily log. 
The expedition left Santa Fe on October 13, and did not sight the enemy 
until November 1. These Navajos promised the Mexicans that they were 
, 
friends and still honored the Treaty of Jemez. Upon approaching 
Chelly on November 20, Archuleta's troops finally encountered the 
Navajos. The battle lasted the major portion of that day, and was 
made most difficult because the Indians controlled a mesa which was 
impossible to capture. The next day Archuleta retreated from the mesa 
31 
and returned to Abiquiu on December 10. 
Armijo must have been dissatisfied with the results of the cam-
paign because another was launched in 1840. In September two 
I 
companies, each consisting of five hundred men:1 were raised by Jose 
Salazar from Ri~ Abaja and Francisco Vigil of Rfo Arriba. The expedi-
tion lasted five weeks and must have been successful judging from the 
amount of booty taken. The most significant prize of the expedition 
was the capture of Chief Largo. In addition, thirty-three Indians 
were killed, blankets valued at one thousand pesos were captured:1 and 
two hundred containers of grain were confiscated. Armijo reported 
that Vigil led his troops up a high mesa without being discovered by 
the Navajos until it was too late. Both Vigil and Salazar were com~ 
32 mended for a job well done. 
Because of these Mexican victories, the Navajos again sued for 
31Military log of Juan Andres Archuleta's campaign against the 
Navajos, October-November, 1839, MANM. 
32Armijo to minister of war~ Santa Fe, October 3, 1840, MANM. 
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peace, resulting in the Treaty of Santo Domingo on March 10 9 1841. 
I 
The treaty was very similar to the one concluded at Jemez in 1839, 
providing for return of captives, reinstatement of corrnnerce, and 
pledges of good faith by both parties. However, in some provisions 
this treaty promised more benefits to the Navajos than had previous 
treaties. Mexican officials promised to pay five hundred sheep to the 
family of any murdered Navajo, plus the gift of small allotrunents of 
money to certain chiefs. The most interesting provision stated that 
because Navajos were Mexican citizens, they were entitled to legal 
protection by Mexican officials. Armijo obviously believed that 
through better terms in the treaty a deeper alliance might be formed. 
Provisions within the treaty also suggested that if the Navajos organ-
ized a political system within their tribe it would be recognized by 
the Mexicans. After 1843, the Navajos ceased as the main disruptive 
h d h h d db h . 33 force int e epartment; t ey were ten supercee e y t e Utes. 
The first real problem encountered with the Utes involved pris-
oners who had been captured from other Plains tribes and then sold to 
Mexicans as slaves. In 1841 and 1842 Arapahos and Kiowas were in-
volved. Charles Bent wrote Manuel Alvarez to warn Armijo that the 
Arapahos had made threats to recover their people held in captivity 
by the Mexicans. He suggested that it would be well for the Mexicans 
to conciliate the Indians before hostilities cormnenced. In addition, 
the Arapahos were inducing the Cheyenne and Sioux to join them against 
the Mexicans. Two renegade Mexicans were to be used as guides by the 
I d . 34 n 1.ans. Nonetheless, the New Mexicans decided not to return the 
33Treaty of Santo Domingo 9 March 10, 1841, MANM. 
34 Bent to Alvarez, Taos, January 16, 1841, "The Bent Papers," 
Vol. XXIX, 311-2. 
captives for two reasons: first, to return them would show that the 
Mexicans feared the Indians; and second, to return them would create 
35 resentment and possible attacks from the Utes. 
One of the best illustrations of the daily Indian menace is seen 
/ 
in !844 while Governor Martinez was attempting to organize a special 
ceremony to be held on September 16 to conunemorate Mexican indepen-
dence. In order to have all preparations and buildings completed by 
that time, the governor appointed a patriotic council composed of the 
leading New Mexicans in the department to organize the celebration. 36 
On August 3 the council met, and established a .program. On inde-
pendence eve all the religious buildings would be illuminated and at 
11:00 p.m., bells would ring, artillery would be fired, and fireworks 
would explode announcing "the glorious moment when national indepen-
69 
dence was proclaimed by the saint, Hidalgo, at the village of Dolores." 
On the morning of the sixteenth the national flag would be raised on 
all public buildings. Vicar Juan Ortiz would celebrate mass, which 
would be attended by the governor. After mass the governor and presi= 
dent of the assembly would conunemorate the day with speeches; this 
would be followed by a march to the plaza. During the afternoon, 
musicians and a circus would perform, ending in a dance for the public 
that evening. During the day following the ceremony bullfights would 
be held. 37 
35Archuleta to Armijo, San Juan, April 1, 1841, MANM. 
36Act establishing patriotism etc., Santa Fe, August 1, 1844, 
MANM. 




While preparations were being made in Santa Fe, the Utes in Ri.'6 
Arriba were becoming troublesome. Archuleta reported that large 
numbers of Utes were uniting near Abiquiu. The chief had told Ar:chu·-
leta that during the past winter a group of Mexican rurales had killed 
three of his sons, mistaking them for Navajos. Later~ these same 
Mexicans killed seven more Utes and stole their horses. At this 
point the chief demanded that in return for the ten Utes killedj) the 
Mexicans must release four Ute Indian boys held captive along with ten 
horses. If the Mexicans paid this to the chief, all claims would be 
forgotten. He warned, however, that he would wait only two days for a 
reply. In forwarding the chief's message, Archuleta reminded Mart{nez 
that he had few troops with which to withstand an attack. 38 
Meanwhile, the patriotic council continued with the organization 
of the dance, having problems enlisting enough musicians to provide a 
_,,, 
band. On September 4, Martinez notified the justice at Abiquiu to take 
all necessary steps to stop the Utes from reaching Santa Fe. The 
/ justice wrote Martinez that the Utes were in an extremely bad temper 
and that Archuleta was unable to pacify them. In addition)) he wrote 
the Indians were planning to march on the capital the next day, 
39 September fifth. 
On September 5, with buildings yet to be completed, platforms yet 
to be built, and decorations yet to be made, over one hundred Utes 
entered Santa Fe mounted on good horses and well armed with lances, 
bows, and axes. On entering the town they demanded a place to spend 
38 / / 
Archuleta to Martinez, Rio Arriba, September: 1, 1844, MANM. 
39 -Martinez to justice of Abiqu:iu, Santa Fe, September 4, 1844, 
MANM. 
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the night and were assigned a vacant lot on the outskirts of town. 
During the night they kept the citizens in constant alarm with their 
warlike songs and noise. The next morning six of the chiefs saddled 
h ' h d ' · G M :"' 4o t eir orses an went to visit overnor artinez. 
Once the chiefs met with the governor, they complained that they 
had not been given the things that they had demanded. 
to give them, yet the Indians remained unsatisfied. 
,.,, 
Martinez agreed 
At this point 
Martfnez lost his patience with the c.hiefs and ordered them out of his 
office; but instead of calming the Utes as he had hoped, the Indians 
became angrier and made obscene gestures at the governor and insulted 
/ 
him verbally. One chief approached Martinez and demanded redress for 
his lndians that had been killed. Mart:fuez pushed him to the door. 
/ 
At that moment Martinez was attacked by all six Indians. One came at 
/ 
the governor with an axe in hand, but Martinez hit him with the chair 
that he had been sitting in. About this time some Mexican officials 
41 heard the noise and rushed into the room to help • 
.,, 
Martinez' wife, Do'na Teresita next rushed in and gave the governor 
his sword so he could defend himself. While the battle was being won 
in the governor's office, the remainder of the Indians attempted to get 
into the brawl by entering the window, but shortly thereafter some of 
the townspeople attacked them. When the chaos ended, the principal 
chief, Panesiyah, had been killed along with four othe·rs; the remainder 
of the Indians escaped, while only three Mexicans were wounded. The 
Indians were then pursued through the streets as they destroyed as 
40 .., 
Perez, "In Santa Fe During the Mexican Regime," 96. 
41Proclamation to the Inhabitant.s of New Mexico from Marti'riez, 
Santa Fe, September 8, 1844, MANM. 
much as possible on their way out of town. 
/ 
Martinez then sent word 
to Archuleta advising him to defend Abiquiu and the frontier as best 
42 
he could. 
For the remainder of the fall an overriding fear of a Ute inva-
sion settled over the New Mexicans. Reports placed the number of 
Ute warriors ready to attack at three thousand and growing. Troops 
72 
were sent to Abiquiu, along with three artillery pieces and 120 
43 
muskets. On September 10 the governor shipped fifteen guns 9 fifteen 
44 
pistols, and fifty rounds of extra ammunition to Taos. Meanwhile, 
the patriotic council tried•to salvage its plans for the ceremonies. 
They blamed the city council of Santa Fe for a lack of cooperation)) 
for refusing to keep animals out of the Plaza 9 and, worst of all for 
allowing the bodies of the dead Utes to lie unburied in the streets. 45 
The Utes that had previously surrounded Abiquiu had dispersed 9 
but rumors persisted in the department that an attack could be ex-
pected at any moment. On September 26, the citizens of Taos sug-
gested that the governor send anns and supplies to them so that they 
could defend the frontier. If the Utes could be stopped from plunder-
ing the villages in the north, they could be starved into submission 
46 as it was too late in the year to hunt buffalo. Not until December 
42rbid., and P{rez, "In Santa Fe During the Mexican Regime," 96-7. 
43 ./ 
Martinez to Archuleta, Santa Fe, September 9, 1844, MANM. 
44rbid., September 10, 1844. 
45Minutes of the patriotic council, Santa Fe, September 12, 1844, 
MANM. 
46citizens of Taos to Archuleta, September 26, 1844~ MANM. 
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I 
was the affair calmed, however. During this month Martinez gave goods 
. 47 
worth more than one thousand pesos to the Indians. As for the out-
come of the patriotic ceremonies, it was probably a let-down compared 
to the Utes attacking Santa Fe, for little was said of it after the 
Ute crisis appeared. 
One cormnon Indian problem for the New Mexican government was 
that of enforcing trade restrictions with the Indians. Among the most 
daring of New Mexicans who traded with the Comanches were the Coman= 
cheros. At first considered hannless 9 these Mexicans later were 
strongly criticized for dealing with the Comanches. In 1845 these 
traders were described by Lieutenant J. J. Abert as poor and shabby 
with "conical-crowned sombrerors, jackets with stripes running trans= 
versely, large bag breeches extending to the knee, long stockings and 
moccasins. 1148 Criticism mounted only when these traders began to 
substitute liquor for blankets and repeating rifles for grain. For 
the most part the Comancheros were not as bothersome to Armijo and 
I 49 
Martinez as were American traders. 
Many slurs were made against the Americans by Padre Jos/ 
I 
Antonio Martinez. He wrote that when New Mexico was under Spanish 
administration, American forts were not allowed to be built. But be= 
cause of the liberal Mexican laws 9 Americans had infested the area. 
47 
Records of departmental treasury, Santa Fe, December 1844, MANM. 
48ueutenant J. J. Abert, Report£!!. the Upper Arkansas and the 
Country of the Comanche Indians, United States Senate Document No. 
438, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., Serial No, 477. 
49charles L. Kenner,!!:_ Histor_y of New Mexican-Plains Indians 
Relations (Norman~ University of Oklahoma Press, 1969), pp. 78-97. 
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The traders sold liquor to the Indians, resulting in these nations be-
coming extremely demoralized. Because of their desire for more liquor 
the Indians were prompted to devastate the buffalo herds in order to 
supply pelts for the purchase of drink. These forts encouraged the 
Indians .. to raid the department in order to obtain the booty which 
could be sold for large profits. 50 
Do.naciano Vigil wrote that while the surrounding Indians were 
continuously improving their condition, that of the Mexicans was de-
clining. American traders on the Arkansas and Red rivers had supplied 
the Indians with everything required to carry on warfare against the 
Mexicans in exchange for pelts. Vigil believed that this situation 
d h I d . 1 11 f 1 h h M · Sl cause t e n ians to ose a respect ormer y sown tote exicans. 
The same basic opinion was held by Armijo, who wrote his central gov-
ernment that foreigners were the cause of many of the problems preva-
lent in the department. He reported that most of the trouble centered 
around Taos where there was evidence of uncontrolled contraband trading. 
This could not be tolerated, he wrote, because the entrance of contra-
band into the department cut· off badly needed revenue and encouraged 
52 
renegade parties to raid caravans bound for Santa Fe. 
The gap between policy and practice was far from small, however, 
and Armijo found that stopping contraband goods and illicit trade was 
not easy. In April of 1841 Damasio Salazar was sent to treat with the 
Mescalero Apaches for peace terms. Armijo was chagrined to learn that 
50J. A. Marti~ez to Santa Anna in Keleher, Turmoil, p. 67. 
51vigil, May 16, 1846, Ritch Collection. 
52A · · · · f S F A · 1 25 1841 MAN rmiJo to minister o war, anta · e, pr1 , , M. 
75 
Salazar's party had been unable to make terms with the Apaches, but 
nonetheless had illegally traded with them. For this action Salazar 
. d 1 h' f A · · 53 receive a severe tongue- as ing rom rmiJo. Trade restriction was 
one of the policies employed by the department, but little could be 
accomplished to force the Apaches into submission while trade con= 
tinued. Fines also were imposed, but Armijo pessimisticly wrote the 
minister of war that it would take at least one thousand soldiers to 
watch all the department in order to control the contraband trade. 
Without a show of military strength the Indians would not respect 
the laws. 54 
One of the department's biggest fears concerning Indian affairs 
was a mass attack by different tribes working under some alliance. In 
1841 these fears became reality. During the year the Navajos had been 
placed under constant pressure by Armijo's military campaigns. Some 
of the chiefs found that many of their warriors were ending hostilities 
on their own account. In order to continue the war the Navajos made 
overtures to some Utes, and by March 26, 1841, these combined forces 
were devastating the frontier at J~ez. Once the Utes had promised to 
help the Navajos, peace offerings from Annijo were ignored. The situa-
tion had degenerated to such an extent that the go:vernor was forced to 
order troops to guard the citizens of Abiquiu and Ojo Caliente when 
h h f . ld f h . 1 . 55 t ey went tote ie s or t e spring panting. The peaceful 
Navajos who had settled down and also had begun their spring planting 
53Armijo to Salazar, Santa Fe, April 23, 1841, MANM. 
54A · · · · f S F S b 7 1840 MA.NM rmiJo to minister o war, anta e, eptem er , , .• 
55Armijo to commandant of the frontier of JEfuiez, Santa Fe, March 
26, 1841, MANM. 
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were rewarded with gifts from Armijo. But within a few weeks the peace-
ful Navajos were back on the warpath because the Utes and hostile Nava-
56 
jos had burned their villages. 
Armijo wrote that the most barbarous tribes plaguing New Mexicans 
were the Navajos, Utes, Timpanagos, Jicarilla and Mescalero Apaches, 
Kiowas, Comanches, and Blackfeet. All these tribes were of the most 
volatile nature and caused great discomfort to the department, inhibit-
ing settlement, trade, and ranching. Interestingly~ Armijo believed 
that the Indian depradations would continue until another era when the 
Indians might lose interest in robbing the frontier. Nonetheless, at 
least one thousand troops would be needed to protect the communities 
1 d . . 57 area yin existence. 
/ 
For both Armijo and Martinez, Indian policies were shaped around 
the department's poor financial and military condition. The pessi-
mistic attitude of the officials was best verbalized by Padre Jos~ 
.,,. 
Antonio Martinez who wrote that the "Indians of New Mexico have neither 
honor, decency, nor conscience, and only consider as superior those 
that are the bravest and most skillful tokill-=their enemies as 
58 
well as others." Although New Mexicans were not without their share 
of courage 9 it was foolhardy to expect an ill-equipped group of part-
time soldiers to compete with some of the most ruthless and experienced 
calvalry units of the period, such as the Comanches and Apaches. 
While the governors had their doubts of ever being able truly to 
56A .. rmiJO to minister of war, Santa Fe, May 8, 1841, MANM. 
57Ibid., September 7, 184-0. 
58 / 
J. A. Martinez to Santa Anna in Keleher, Turmoil, p. 70. 
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control their Indian inhabitants, they did have some clear strategy to 
combat them. The first method was that of conciliation. Armijo used 
this to good result in dealing with the Comanches, but found few perma-
nent results through its application with other tribes. Second, both 
governors attempted to make peace treaties with the Indians, but 
idealistic terms and provisions usually rendered them inoperative 
within a short time. The rural militia was an important element of 
the plan to control the Indians. Their success was limited to few 
victories and fewer captives. They did provide an advance guard to 
hold the Indians in check until the regulars could be sent.to the area. 
Fourth, the military expeditions were successful to the extent that 
they stopped that one immediate threat to the frontier, but long-tenn 
gains were few indeed. Finally, the goverrnnent tried to control the 
Indians by overseeing their commerce. This strategy could have been 
useful for the department had the government possessed the means to 
enforce its trade regulations. For the most part, however, the results 
were inconclusive except in the respect that the New Mexicans lost no 
ground to the Indians and continued at least to hold them in check. 
Because of the severe pressures that the Indians exerted on New Me.xico, 
it is little wonder that the governors looked with disfavor on American 
traders, who, they were sure, provided the Indians with both the means 
and the motive for their depradations. 
CHAPTER V 
AMERICAN ANTAGONISTS 
The leading .American trader in New Mexico undoubtedly was Charles 
Bent. He and his brother, William, built the Old Fort (Bent's Fort) 
on the Arkansas during 1833 and 1834. By 1840 Charles Bent had become 
as influential in the area of politics as in commerce in New Mexico 9 
and felt that the consul for the United States, Manuel Alvarez, de-
served his knowledgeable help. After 1837 Bent spent increasingly more 
time in New Mexico and shortly thereafter supervised the Bent, St. 
Vrain & Company store in Taos. Having married a Mexican woman, Bent 
qualified for Mexican citizenship; with this wedge into New Mexican af-
fairs, he became a continual interference into the process of depart-
mental government. He 9 and others like him, were seen as adventurers 
by New Mexican officials; these men were insensitive to Mexican customs 
and became concerned about affairs in the department only when these 
directly effected their purses. The relationship between .Americans 
and New Mexicans was usually uncordial and frequently strained. 
Armijo always was concerned about the activities at Bent's Fort 9 
but he respected Bent as a man who, like himself 9 had allowed little 
to block his path to success. Armijo had little doubt that Bent was 
in collusion with the Texans and had given information to the invaders, 
that Bent allowed .American fugitives from Mexican justice to hide in 
his fort, and that Bent sold firearms to unfriendly Indians and thereby 
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increasing hostilities for New Mexicans. In 1840 Armijo wrote that 
the dangers suffered by New Mexicans was caused by various forts, the 
nearest of which was Bent's. If the president did not remedy this 
situation, New Mexico would suffer total ruin. In reality, little 
could be done by the Mexicans because the fort clearly sat i.nside the 
United States. 1 
In dealing with the New Mexicans, Bent usually followed three 
different strategies, depending on the authority and power of the New 
Mexican involved. Bent's relations with Armijo best exemplify his 
attempts at conciliation. Only rarely would he confront A:tmijo 
directly, but his opinions were made known. In corrununicating with 
the governor, Bent usually followed proper channels; that is, he would 
send word through Manuel Alvarez to be relayed to the governor. Bent's 
position was typical of early Americans in New Mexico; nothing could 
proceed correctly unless he had a hand in it. Lack of modesty on Bent's 
part did not mean lack of intelligence, however. Bent expended consi-
derable effort to please the governor. In February 1841, for example, 
he supplied Armijo with one keg of gunpowder and ten pounds of 
coffee, both of which were extremely difficult to obtain in New Mexico.2 
With the governor, however, Bent was not afraid to use the stick 
as well as the carrot. In March 1841, Bent was under attack by Mexi-
can officials for causing Indian hostilities. During the Ute slave-
trading episode Armijo believed that Bent had the intent of profiting 
1navid Lavender, Bent's Fort (New Yorkg Doubleday & Company, 
1954), p. 194. 
2 Bent to Alvarez, Taos, February 26, 1841, "The Charles Bent 
Papers." Vol. XXX, 154. 
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through warfare, and refused to take the trader's advice concerning 
the incident. Bent wrote that in the future he would keep his opin-
ions to himself. He explained to Alvarez, who would pass the infonna-
tion on to Armijo, that if the Indians robbed a wagon train of eighty 
to one hundred thousand dollars worth of goods, he could get the whole 
amount from them for fifteen to twenty thousand dollars of trinkets. 
This would be much to his interest, as would any form of Mexican-Indian 
hostilities, for the Indians would then be forced to trade with Bent. 
Although Bent assured Alvarez that he had no such intentions, the 
3 warning was clear. 
Of the second group of Mexicans with whom Bent dealt, Padre Jos: 
, I 
Antonio Martinez best exemplifies his strategy. Martinez was a good 
friend of Armijo and had the governor's ear on many affairs. Yet, 
the padre was staunchly anti-foreign in general and anti-American in 
particular. The two had a mutual dislike for the other, yet the 
battle was one of words rather than of violence. Martib.ez had come 
from a rich family and owned considerable tracts of land in northern 
New Mexico; these fine grazing lands also were desired by Bent. For-
r 
tunately the pair never came to blows, but if words could kill Martinez 
surely would have died. 
. ~ 
In one of his better descriptions of Martinez, Bent wrote that 
the Father, in January of 1841, had recently returned from visiting 
the Bishop and had been "constantly employed since he got home de-
tailing to his greedy admirers, and hearers, the great respect and 
attention that was bestowed on him in his last trip to Durango.'' 
3Ibid., March 29, 1841, 158. 
The padre told how all considered him as one of the greatest men of 
the age, as a writer, ecclesiastic, jurist, and philanthropist. This 
was possible, wrote Bent, because the father was a master at studying 
nature in her "nudist" guise. Bent concluded, "He is a prodigy, and 
his great name deserves to be written in letters of gold in all high 
places that this gaping and ignorant multitude might fall down and 
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worship it. 11 Sarcastic remarks such as this by Bent were comm.on. 
He knew that Martinez was most likely saying the same about him to the 
governor. Wisely, however, Bent refrained from open attacks, realiz-
ing that a man who conferred with the governor and·who controlled the 
parish faithful could deeply hurt him. 4 
When conciliation a.nd verbal assault failed to satisfy a man's 
honor, there was always physical recourse. In early 1841, a certain 
Juan Vigil brought claims against Bent and William Workman. The 
content of these claims is unknown, but probably included reports that 
Workman and Bent were involved in the Texan invasion. It was during 
this episode that Bent promised the gunpowder and coffee to Armijo, 
perhaps to improve the atmosphere. Nonetheless, on February 19, Bent 
and Workman presented Vigil with a copy of these "false representa-
tions," and after he had read them and was asked if they were the ones 
forwarded to the governor, Vigil said that they were. Thereupon Work-
man struck Vigil with. his whip and then beat him with his fists until 
Bent pulled him off the M~xican. Vigil then "ran for his life,"--
probably straight to the alcalde, for Bent and Workman were arrested. 5 
4Ibid., January 30, 1841, Vol. XXIX, 313-5. 
5Ibid., February 19, 1841, 315. 
The suit was never brought to court, however, and Bent causticly re-
marked to Alvarez, "I had rather have the satisfaction of whipping a 
man that has wronged me than to have him punished by law ••• ; [only] 
cowards and women take this satisfaction. 116 
Vigil had anned himself with a bowie knife and had sworn revenge 
on Bent and Workman, assuring them that both heretics would shortly 
be with the devil. With insults hurled back and forth between them 1 
it was presumably a mere coincidence that accounted for an attack on 
V. ·1 7 1.g1. • Four men approached Vi~il's home at night, but barking dogs 
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warned him of trouble and he "fled nearly naked and crossed the prairie 
to Del Norte and laid there all day.". Bent later remarked, "I think 
Juan Vigil will be heartily tired of the Valley of Taos if he is 
scared once or twice more. 118 In pursuing this form of strategy, the 
Ame.ricans made few friends among the Mexicans. 
If Workman was incensed because Vigil had accused him of Texan 
sympathies, he had little defense. This American, along with John 
Rowland, were commissioners working with William Dryden to extend the 
Texan domain. Little is known of these two men and their background. 
Workman and Rowland were early Santa Fe traders and possibly naturalized 
Mexican citizens. Workman had previously trapped with the Patties to 
the Gila and later made his home in Taos. Rowland came to'New Mexico 
from Pennsylvania and engaged in beaver trapping and also settled in 
Taos where he built a flour mill, distillery, and store. In 1841, 
6 Ibid., no date (probably between February 20 and 25) 1841, 315. 
7 Lavender, Bent's~, p. 198. 
8 Bent to Alvarez, Taos, March 22, 1841, "The Charles Bent Papers," 
Vol. XXX, 157. 
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when anti-American sentiment reached a high pitch in the department, 
these two men decided to leave New Mexico in search of better land and 
. . . C l "f . 9 opportunities in a i ornia. 
Benjamin D. Wilson, a Tennesseean who joined the Workman-Rowland 
party, lived in New Mexico for seven years prior to 1841. He des-
cribed conditions facing foreigners in New Mexico at this time, and 
wrote that: Workman and Rowland were in correspondence with prominent 
parties in Texas in the belief that the Texan expedition would succeed. 
Word leaked out that these men were allied with the Texans. After 
Armijo had exhorted the citizens to meet the Texan invasion, a mob 
approached some foreigners with designs of killing and robbing them, 
but were halted by Armijo. Owing to this unhealthy climate, Workman, 
Rowland, and twenty others concluded that it was not safe to remain 
1 . M • 10 any onger in New exico. 
Both Workman and Rowland were acquainted with California through 
the reports of traders, and possibly had visited the country previous-
ly. The annual caravan to California already had. been granted per-
mission to leave New Mexico on August 6, 1841 by Armijo. Tensions 
were mounting in Santa Fe during the following month; then on Septem-
ber 11, Consul Alvarez was attacked by a mob of Mexicans. It was 
during this week that the Workman-Rowland party left Santa Fe, staying 
close to the trade caravan route for protection. By September 22, the 
party had clearly departed Santa Fe, for Armijo wrote the minister 
9 LeRoy R. Hafen and Ann 
Fe~ Los Angeles (Glendale: 
p. 205. 
W. Hafen, The Old Spanish Trail: Santa 
The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1954), 
10B. D. Wilson as quoted in Hafen, Old Spanish Trail, p. 204. 
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of war that the naturalized foreigners Rowland and Workman had left 
for California to seduce and confuse its inhabitants. He suggested 
that they be captured and punished, as this would be the only method 
of preventing the further evils that they planned to cormnit in Cali-
f . 11 ornia. 
While some Americans left New Mexico for better conditions, one 
who was attracted to the Mexican Southwest for its poor conditions be ... 
came famous, or rather infamous, for hunting Indians in order to 
receive the bounty paid by the Department of Chihuahua. James K.irker 9 
scalphunter, arrived in New Mexico with a party of Americans in the 
fall of 1839. His stay in the department evidently caused Armijo much 
consternation. Unfortunately for the governor, his policy of com= 
mercial restrictions against the Apaches was having little effect, and 
fear was expressed that the Indians would shortly leave their villages 
for the warpath. At this point Kirker's party began their operations 
in the department by stealing animals from peaceful Apaches who had 
recently concluded a peace treaty with Armijo. When he was con-
fronted with evidence of taking these animals~ Kirker stated that the 
mounts had been stolen originally from him. Nonetheless, Armijo re-
turned the horses to the Indians and told Kirker that proof of stolen 
goods must be obtained from the local government. This episode was 
12 
only the start. 
At midnight on Septembe.r 26, Kirker and his men crashed a dance 
held by Francesca Caballero, resulting in the death of Jost'Guerrero, 
llA .·' ' ' f S F S b 22 1841 . rmiJo to minister o· war, anta e, eptem er , , in 
Hafen, Old Spanish Trail, pp. 206-11. 
12Armijo to Archuleta, Santa Fe, September 11, 1839, MANM. 
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a friend of the hostess. The testimony of the Americans and that of 
the Mexicans was very different in content. Robert Beal, the accused 
murderer, said that the Americans had been invited to the gathering, 
but that upon arriving a quarrel resulted, although he knew not who 
started it. In the ensuing fight Beal stated that he was forced to 
defend himself. This caused the death of Guerrero. Mexicans at 
the dance testified that the Americans demanded food and drink after 
forcing an entry into the house. When the Mexicans refused, the 
Americans started shooting at them. Because firearms were outlawed 
in Santa Fe, the Mexicans defended thei:p.selves with sticks and rocks 
but could do little until authorities arrived on the scene. Beal 
spent less than a week in the jail but eventually was released because 
of the license that Kirker had as ~'soldiers of fortune'' from Chihuahua. 
Although Beal escaped Mexican justice he was unable to avoid court 
fees, which totaled more than thirteen pesos. 13 
Through the months of September and October, tension mounted for 
the New Mexicans while this scalphunter and his men stayed in Santa Fe. 
Little could be done by Armijo because Kirk.er was duly authorized by 
the central government and the Department of Chihuahua to hunt enemy 
Indians throughout the Northern departments. By November Kirker headed 
south, but there was no end to his mischief until he was completely 
out of the department. While passing through Socorro he seized some 
horses and cows from local residents. Concerning the complaints that 
followed Kirker as he left the department, Governor Cordero of Chihua-
hua assured Armijo that he had a special fund for such cases and that 
13Preceedings against Robert Beal, Santa Fe, September 26, 1839, 
MANM. 
all damages caused by this volatile American would be paid in full by 
the Department of Chihuahua. 14 
While Mexicans fumed over the unwanted scalphunters, Americans 
also had their problems in dealing with the Mexicans. A typical 
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charge brought against Armijo was that he was lax toward criminals who 
committed crimes against Americans. Such was the case. when Joseph 
Pulsiphur, an American, was killed at Mora on November 9, 1840. Ameri~ 
cans charged that nothing was being done by New Mexican authorities to 
catch the murderer, Juan Cristobal Armijo. Tempers rose over the 
incident, and Bent wrote that every American was interested in captur-
ing the accused as it was the fourth murder that had been committed 
on American citizens in the last few years. He believed that even if 
twenty people were involved in the murder, all should be put to deathg 
"It is the duty of the authorities to have the murderers punished with 
death, and all expenses should be de.frayed by the government." Bent 
told Alvarez that as consul, it was his duty to find any relatives of 
h d d d k f 11 t t th .. t . M . 15 t e ecease an to ma ea u sta eme.nt o e minis er in .exico. 
Although Bent and many others were naturalized Mexican citizens, they 
usually relied on their American citizenship to provide better treat-
ment and faster results when conditions became troubled. 
An investigation into the affair was launched, but little was 
learned except that Pulsiphur was traveling to Taos when he was 
attacked at the Sapello River near Mora. Juan Armijo seemed to be the 
leader of three men who, after attacking him, divided Pulsiphur•s 
14 
Cordero to Armijo, Chihuahua, June 28, 1840, MANM. 
15 
Bent to Alvarez, Taos, December 1, 1841, "The Charles Bent 
Papers," Vol. XXIX, 338-9. 
goods among themselves, and then fled from the site of the crime. 
Juan Armijo and his gang were not caught by the authorities, and the 
matter remained unresolved--much to the disgust of Charles Bent and 
16 
Manuel Alvarez. 
A lesser conflict also proved to the Americans that they were 
being discriminated against. In 1841 Alvarez informed the governor 
that Americans were being forced to pay a thirty peso surcharge for 
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the marriage ceremony. Alvarez petitioned the governor for an explana-
tion, writing that Vicar Ortiz was treating Americans unfairly and 
illegally. 17 Authorities in Santa Fe replied that ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction was independent of civil authorities and that the fee 
would continue to be charged. until the bishop of Durango could give 
a decision. Meanwhile, Armijo refused to interfere in any way with 
h . 18 t e vicar. 
The vicar was unquestionably anti-foreign, and most probably did 
not correspond at all about the matter to the bishop in Durango. Des-
pite Alvarez' threats and pleas, little was accomplished due to the 
strong anti-American sentiment running through New Mexico because of 
reports of an impending Texan invasion. The vicar explained that 
according to a law of May 22, 1819, such a fee was to be charged to all 
foreigners desiring a marriage ceremony. That the law was passed 
under Spanish authority made little difference to Ortiz. In a strongly 
16Proceedings concerning the death of Joseph Pulsiphur, Santa Fe, 
February 3, 1841, MANM. This writer has been unable to establish any 
relation between Juan Armijo and the governor. This is not to say 
that the two were unrelated however. 
17Alvarez to Miranda, Santa Fe, May 24, 1841 9 MANM. 
18Armijo to Alvarez, Santa Fe, May 24, 1841, MANM. 
worded letter Ortiz wrote that Mexicans must preserve their national 
heritage and resist enemy advancements in every fo:rm. Obviously, the 
vicar was doing his part to save New Mexico in the battle against the 
19 
Anglos by charging this fee. 
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Situations such as this appear to have been the major concern for 
the consul of the United States. Although four consuls were given the 
position at Santa Fe, none were recognized by the Mexican government, 
and only Alvarez truly attempted to carry out American state depart-
ment orders and send reports. Ceran St. Vrain, a Missourian and one 
time partner of Charles Bent, was appointed in 1834 to the post but 
never assumed the duties. Alvarez took the position on March 21, 
20 1839 and reached Santa Fe in July of that year. Throughout his 
tenure as consul--until 1844--his position became more a personal 
rivalry with Annijo than one of diplomatic pacification. Both men 
were engaged in the Santa Fe trade and thus were commercial rivals as 
well as political contestants. While Alvarez was a most important 
source of strength for Americans in New Mexico, it is plain that 
Armijo used the consul as a sounding board in order to gauge the 
response of Americans to daily issues. When Alvarez became too de-
mantling on the government, he was reminded that his recognition as 
consul was only a courtesy because of the friendly relations between 
the two governments, but because he did not have an exequatur, a 
certificate of legal diplomatic status, from the Mexican government, 
190 · M" d L Bl A 2 1841 MANM rtiz to iran a, a anca, ugust , , • 
20Max L. Moorhead, New Mexico's Royal Road (Nonnan: University 
of Oklahoma Press, 1958), pp. 123-4n. 
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he could not legitimately exercise his functions as consul. 21 
The Americans were further frustrated by what they considered 
unfair trade restrictions. During 1837-1843 Armijo followed little 
precedent in establishing taxes, providing rather a single direct tax 
on all goods entering the department. To some degree this policy 
contributed to his resignation in 1843. James Webb pointed out that 
the only reason for importing goods through Santa Fe instead of Chi-
huahua or ~nother port of entry was the liberal tax relaxations made 
by Armijo. However practical this policy was in encouraging the 
trade in New Mexico, it evidently did not meet with official approval. 
/ 
Webb quoted Governor Martinez as telling Armijo that Santa Anna wanted 
a change in the department because of the exceedingly corrupt adminis-
tration. Armijo admitted stealing but added. that he had something 
/ 
to show for it; Martinez, he knew, also stole, but had nothing to show 
for it. While Webb's relation of this conversation may be somewhat 
exaggerated, it does show that new financial plans were to be put into. 
/ 
effect in New Mexico and that Martinez would be the one to see that 
22 they were enforced. 
Communications from the central gover-mnent in 1843 outlined new 
plans which they hoped would bolster the departmental economy. The 
/ guiding light behind these proposals was Lucas Alaman, general director 
of national industry. Much could be done to liberate the department 
from financial worries through a new program, but the closing of the 
21Miranda to Alvarez, Santa Fe, October 11, 1841, MANM. 
22 .Webb, Santa Fe Trade, p. 84. 
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Northern frontier to commerce in 184323 was the key to the remainder 
of the policies. Although some members of the central government 
recommended encouraging commerce and industry, official proclamations 
more often laid down restrictions that impeded rather than fostered 
the national economy. 
/ 
Alam.an encouraged each department to form 
. ' 
councils to work toward improving the general welfare of the Republic. -Martinez informed him that although there was no industry or manu-
, 24 
facturing in New Mexico, attempts would be made to promote commerce. 
For New Mexicans it was difficult to understand how the govern-
ment expected the department to increase commerce when their only port 
of entry had been closed. Because the citizens conducted campaigns 
against the department's enemies at their own risk and expense, de-
crees calling for tax contributions were not enforced in New Mexico. 
Consequently the only source of income was the customs house which 
was presently closed. Although New Mexicans did not learn of it until 
July 1, 1844, the trade officially was re-opened on March 11, 1844. 
Know Ye: The national congress a.nd executives have 
declared the following:. 
Article one: Declared open to foreign trade are the 
customs of Taos in the department of New Mexico and 
of El Paso del Norte and Presidio del Norte of the 
Department of Chihuahua. 
Article two: Merchandise, fruits, and goods which 
may be introduced through said cust'oms remain subject 25 
to the payment of importation taxes and existing laws. 
In reality, the closing of the New Mexican customs from August 7, 1843, 
to March 11, 1844 had little direct effect on New Mexicans because it 
23 Decree of August 7, 1843, Mexico, MA.NM. 
24M ./ d" . l f . 1 i d S F artinez to irector genera o nationa n ustry, anta e, 
May 11, 1844, ~M. 
25 Decree of March 11, 1844, Mexico, MA.NM. 
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was the off-season of the trade. The customs were open for the first 
trade caravans of 1844 and provided needed revenue for the debt-ridden 
department. 
One of the first traders to reach New Mexico after the customs 
had re-opened was James Webb, who complained that Governor Mart:fr1ez 
demanded 750 dollars entry tax per wagon. He accused both Governors 
/ 
Martinez and Annijo of stealing, claiming that Armijo was more clever 
at it than Martinez because he had money to pay his troops while Mar-
.,,. 
tinez did not. Webb and his party experienced difficulties~ delays, 
and expense in entering their goods. Frustrating them further was 
an additional assessment of one percent which had been recently im~ 
posed on foreign goods by the departmental assembly in order to meet 
an immediate financial crisis. Because the Americans were not allowed 
to retail in Santa Fe, they traveled for three weeks in southern New 
Mexico, stopping at local villages but selling only 400 dollars worth 
of merchandise. On March 3, 1845, Webb sold his remaining stock to 
Mexican traders and returned to St. Louis to prepare for another jour-
26 
ney. 
Owing to the floundering economy of the nation, exact procedures 
were sent from the central government to regulate trade. After 1844 
Mart(r;ez put into practice many of the laws that had been on the re= 
cord books but had never been enforced. 
/ 
Martinez made each trader -and passenger secure a guia or permit, as required by law, and kept 
careful records of traders and goods passing through New Mexico. 
Further laws were placed in force by a decree of December 28, 
26webb, Santa Fe Trade, pp. 81-88. 
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1843. This decree shows the fondness of the Mexicans for keeping an 
account of the minutest details of the trade. Accordingly, the trader 
had to meet basic requirements before he could trade. If his mer-
chandise did not exceed one hundred pesos in value, he had to secure 
a travel pennit; if his merchandise was valued at more than one hundred 
pesos, he was expected to secure a travel permit and also a trade per~ 
mit. Each wagon was to be care.fully inventoried showing its total 
value, for a tax of one percent would be collected whenever the wagon 
left one department and entered another. A complicated provision also 
p:.:-ovided that the trader must carry sufficient money to pay all taxes 
levied along his route. Eighty pesos for each ten mules for every one 
hundred leagues was considered adequate. In the event of robbery 
while on the road, the trader was immediately to report the affair to 
the nearest alcalde. 
Traders would not be allowed to clear customs until all their 
credentials were in order. Not complying with any one of five dif-
ferent provisions would make his goods liable to immediate confisca~ 
tion. First, the trader was to have all documents concerning the 
caravan and his goods with him at all times. Second, the information 
on these documents must conform exactly with the cargo in the caravan. 
Third, the documents could not be mutilated in any way. Fourth, the 
caravan was to follow only those routes specifically designated by 
the authorities. Fifth, the trader must report, without fail, to 
every custom house along his route. 
All foreign imports that were prohibited by law were to be con-
fiscated, and fines were to be levied equal to the value of the 
merchandise. Traders were held responsible for knowing which goods 
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were prohibited and which goods were controlled by national monopoly. 
Some of the goods controlled by national monopoly were tobacco, gun-
powder, fireworks, sulphur, and paper. According to this decree, if 
the trader could not pay the fine for importing these goods, he would 
serve from two to eight years in textile factories called obrajes or 
in private homes. 
Goods that were confiscated by officials were to be returned to 
the customs to await a judicial decision. Invariably such goods were 
declared contraband. The trader would be charged with payment of 
court fees, including the salaries of the judge, scribe, and treasury 
official. If the defendant did not appear, five percent of the goods 
would be taken to meet these costs. Animals engaged in transporting 
contraband also were to be termed confiscated and were to be included 
in the total evaluation of all goods. Of the remaining amount, after 
the five percent for court fees, a three-way division was to be made 
among whoever apprehended the goods the accuser, and the fiscal (or 
administrator of taxes). The central government hoped that these laws 
would discourage the contraband trade and simplify taxation pro.,,.. 
27 
cedures. 
Other legalities also restricted the trade for Americans. 
Another imposition was the carta de segti'ridad (or safe conduct pass); 
' 
every foreigner had to obtain this permit in order to travel or 
reside within the Republic. If the foreigner did not have this pass 
on his person at all times, he could be imprisoned. It cost only three 
dollars and could be obtained from the central authorities through the 
27 
Decree to regulate interior commerce of the Republic, Mexico, 
December 28, 1843, MANM. 
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consul at Mexico City, who was to certify the foreigner's national 
citizenship. However, ,the pass was valid only for one year, and there 
was considerable inconvenie.nce in obtaini!).g it because it was risky to 
send money through the mails and few of the foreigners had established 
credit in Mexico City. 28 In reality, the trade restrictions were such 
a mass of overlapping and unclear provisions that officials in New 
Mexico paid little attention to the national policy. But there were 
attempts to limit the amount of contraband and to stop Americans from 
cheating the customs. Mexican authorities would dispatch a company 
of Mexican soldiers to meet the merchants under the pretense of guarding 
them from Indian attack. "But their real object," wrote William Boggs, 
"was to see that no goods or wagons were smuggled into the country to 
escape the heavy duties. 1129 Another reason for sending out troops was 
to stop the traders from loading all their goods on as few wagons as 
possible because the governor usually charged a flat rate per wagon 
instead of individual taxes on goods. 
Webb admitted to this practice of loading the wagons to great 
. h . d h f- 'bl JO dB we1g_ ts in or er to ave as · ·ew as poss1 e, an ent once wrote 
Alvarez in 1844 that his brother George was coming to Santa Fe. with 
eight wagons but would have only five by the time he reached the 
capital. Bent warned Alvarez that it would be best to say nothing of 
his arrival for fear that an escort might be sent out before he left 
28 
Moorhead, Royal Road, pp. 144-5. 
29 
Hafen~ "The W. M. Boggs Manuscript," 58. 
30webb, Santa Fe Trade, p. 86. 
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the three wagons behind. 31 Richard L. Wilson also wrote that in an-
ticipation of the arrival of his party at Santa Fe, five loads were com-
pressed into four wagons, and contraband goods were sent by a different 
b k h h . . 32 route y pac orse tote interior. The system was productive at 
both ends. The Mexican tradition of officials earning their livelihood 
through graft from public office was overlooked in the poverty-ridden 
department, ,and despite the "heavey and exorbitant'' rates of taxes 
placed on each wagon--ranging from 500 to 750 dollars--they were far 
less than the average legal duties would have amounted to. These legal 
duties have been estimated by recent historians to be anywhere from 
33 one thousand to two thousand dollars per wagon. 
The nature of the trade can be reconstructed from the ledgers 
of Manuel Alvarez, who, when not defending American interests, par-
ticipated in this trade. All traders bought their goods from stores 
in the east, but by 1840 most of the traders had eliminated the 
middleman in the operation by buying directly from the wholesalers. 
Alvarez made three trips to the eastern markets in the winters of 
1838-1839, 1841-1842, and 1843-1844. Gene.rally he bought his goods 
from New York and Philadelphia, although there is evidence that he 
traveled to London in 1844. / Alvarez and his partner, Damasio Lopez, 
sold goods wholesale as far north as Abiquiu and Taos, and as far 
south as Chihuahua in addition to their retail business. The many 
31 
Bent to Alvarez, Taos, November 12, 1844, "The Charles Bent 
Papers," Vol. XXX, 166-7. 
32Richard L. Wilson, Short Ravelings from a Long Yarn (Santa 
Anna, California: Fine Arts Press, 1936), p. 130. 
33 Moorhead, Royal Road, p. 127. 
96 
beads and other trinkets that Alvarez bought shows that his trade 
with the Indians was very important. Although supplying New Mexicans 
with many goods that were unobtainable from Mexico, these traders also 
provided a rudimentary form of banking, giving credit and cashing 
34 notes. 
The conflicts between the Mexicans and Americans over the Santa 
Fe trade continued to provoke quarrels between the participants 
throughout both governor's terms. Another area 9 that of mining, also 
gave rise to arguments. The mines of Cerrillos, some twenty-five 
miles south of Santa Fe, were known for their productivity, especially 
one in the area known as El Placer. The value of gold extracted from 
the mines between the years 1832 and 1835 was estimated at between 
sixty and eighty thousand dollars per year. The dust and grains ob= 
tained at these mines were virgin gold and of very fine quality. Once 
the presence of gold was verified, the central government prohibited 
11 ' f k" h . 35 a persons except natives rom wor ing t e mines. 
While a desire to keep the foreigners out of the mining business 
undoubtedly motivated the department to provide a system of law en-
forcement at the camps, Mexican officials also were attempting to end 
the smuggling of gold out of the department and into the United States. 
Precious metals were forbidden to leave the country, but evidently 
much escaped; Josiah Gregg, for example, provided exact figures of the 
worth of the gold after it was processed by the United States mint. 36 
34Lansing B. Bloom, "Ledgers of a Santa Fe Trader," New Mexico 
Historical Review, Vol. XXI (April, 1946), 135-9. 
35 Gregg, Connnerce, pp. 109-10. 
36Ibid., P• 108. 
Although foreigners were lawfully banned from participating in 
mining, Wislizenus wrote that he had conferred with a Mr. ·.Watrous 
from New England, a Mr. Tournier from France, and a Mr. Campbell 
from the United States; by taking a Mexican as a partner, they were 
able to engage in the business and at the same time obvi"ate the law~ 
In consequence of such actions,· the authorities would eject an owner 
37 
and confiscate his property from time to time. 
Perhaps owing to these conflicts and the poor conditions at the 
camps, ·attempts were made by officials in New Mexico to establish a 
clear code of ordinances organizing civil authority in the camps in 
1844. Provis.ions were drafted by. Manuel Delgado and provided the 
following: \first, a public school and jail were to be established; 
second, criminals would be forced to work on public projects, but 
for this work would receive a wage that would be divided for their 
.. 
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own use; and third, criminals would be'provided a complete set of tools 
to work·the placer; fourth, women also knew how to commit crimes, 
and jails were to be built to correct these women who could make the 
meals for the other criminals; fift:h, a military force of twelve to 
fifte.en men would be established at .. the mines; sixth, treasury accounts 
were to be checked at least once every month; seventh,·· debts owed by 
deceased individuals could not be collected from relatives. 
· Eighth, money could be loaned at an interest rate of one real per 
peso per week; ninth, each citizen had to work his claim within fif-
t,een days, and if he failed to do so the claim would revert.~to the 
government; tenth, if a citizen did not appear in court after being 
37wislizenus, "Memoirs, 11 .p. 32. 
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called he could be fined two reales; eleventh, criminals had to work 
for their subsistence while serving their term; twelfth, because rob-
beries of merchants were committed owing to the needs of the thieves, 
criminals would be fined only t:';he value of tha.t which they~:st.ole, and 
thirteenth, all goods introduced by merchants were to be inspected, 
for poor-quality merchandise lessened the ability of those who worked. 
Some of these ordinances, specifically the seventh, twelfth, and 
thirteenth, clearly showed an anti-American sentiment. Evidently 
these ordinances provided the means for restoring order in the mining 
camps, however, for little further correspondence concerning them comes 
38 
to light. 
Another area of conflict between .Americans and Mexican officials 
was that of land grants. Many foreigners in New Mexico had become 
Mexican citizens and wished to apply for tracts of land wit~in the 
depar.tment. Under a presidential decree of March 1842, all land 
grants in frontier departments had first to be approved by the central 
government. However, some grants had previously been made, and a 
legal battle over many of the claims would continue until .American 
occupation. One of the best known Mexican land grants, the Beaubien-
Miranda grant, showed the difference of opinions not only between the 
foreigners and Mexicans, but also between the Mexicans themselves. 
The original petition wa.s made to Armijo in January ·Of 1841 by 
Charles Beaubien and Guadalupe Miranda. Beaubien was a prosperous 
merchant in Taos who had fled Canada in 1800 because he.realized that 
the priesthood--for which he was being trained--would never suit him. 
38ordinances prepared by Manuel Delgado, Tuerto, March 17,_ 1844, 
MANM. 
In 1827 he married a New Mexican woman after trapping for some time 
in that area, and by 1829 had become a naturalized citizen of Mexico. 
Beaubien became wealthy and politically dominant in the close-knit 
39 
foreign colony of Taos. Miranda was a native-born Mexican who had 
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discharged the duties as departmental secretary, collector of customs, 
and as the private secretary to Manuel Armijo. He was a very patri-
otic Mexican and quite loyal to Armijo. 40 
In their petition, Beaubien and Miranda wrote that New Mexico 
was one of the most backward departments in Mexico because of the 
paucity of industry and manufactures. Yet all the physical con-
ditions of New Mexico favored expansion and exploitation. By granting 
undeveloped tracts of land to private individuals, the idle people 
of the department, who constituted a financial burden to all. 
could be located on these lands to make them productive. Both also 
added that they had large families to support and needed more land 
f f . 41 or anm.ng. The wisdom of Beaubien's diplomatic maneuver of having 
Miranda as a partner was seen by Annijo's almost innnediate.granting 
of the land three days later. Annijo agreed that the·petitioners were 
in confonnity with the law and granted them the land "in order that 
they make the proper use of it which the law allows. 1142 
39 
Lavender, Bent's Fort, p. 164. 
40Jim Berry Pearson, The Maxwell Land Grant (Nonnan: University 
of Oklahoma Press, 1961),~ 4. 
41Petition of Miranda and Beaubien, Santa Fe, January 8, 1841, 
in Ralph Emerson Twitchell, The Spanish Archives of New Mexico 
(Cedar Rapids, Iowa: The Torch Press, 1914), Vol:-I7"°Pp. 63-5. 
42william A. Keleher, Maxwell Land Grant: A New Mexican Item 
(Santa Fe: The Rydal Press, 1942)~ 15. - ----
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Because of the strong anti-American feeling in New Mexico at 
this time giving to the Texan invasions, little was done with the land 
until 1843. One of the most interesting aspects of this land grant 
was the role of silent partners. In March of 1843, agreements were 
made with both Manuel Armijo and Charles Bent, independent of each 
other, giving them one fourth interest in the grant •. Earlier, Miranda 
and Beaubien went through the ceremony of taking possession of the 
43 · 
land by pulling weeds and tossing dirt. Up to this point the land 
grant was in accordance with Armijo's policy of allowing foreigners to 
colonize vast expanses of empty lands with the. expectation that they 
would defend them against an invading army or marauding Indians. 
This official policy changed when Mariano ch.(vez became acting 
44 governor. 
, ,~ 
Governor Chavez, brother of the murdered Jose~ had no love for 
foreigners, and at the urging of Padre Jost!"'Antonio Marti(ez suspended 
the grant on February 27, 1844. The padre charged that Beaubien's 
ownership meant the grant was secretly controlled by foreigne.rs--which 
it was--and that common grazing lands had been removed from Indian 
pueblos. 
., ' 
When Chavez resigned because of illness, the president of 
departmental assembly, Felipe Sena, ordered that the land be returned 
to Beaubien and Miranda. With this news, colonization schemes were 
begun by the Canadian. 46 
43 Lawrence R. Murphy, "The Beaubien and Miranda Land Grant, 1841-
1846," New Mexico Historical Review, Vol. XLII (January, 1967), 31-2. 
44 Lavender, Bent's Fort, p. 403. 
45 See page 46 above. 
46 Murphy, 11The Beaubien and Miranda Land Grant, 1841-1846," 33. 
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/ When Mariano Martinez became governor in April, the conflict was 
renewed. Mart~z was adamant about keeping foreigners from acquiring 
property or starting colonies, perhaps with visions of Texan history 
fresh in his mind. Therefore, Beaubien once again was prohibited 
from starting his colony at El Ponil. Beaubien was advised that he 
and his companions could remain at El Ponil only until.· they had har-
d h . 47 veste t eir current crops. Beaubien was not alone, however, in his 
fight for land. An American trader, John Scolly, and other foreigners 
were denied petitions for land grants also in Northern New Mexico. 48 
Once Armijo returned as governor, the winds of fortune shifted 
once again for Beaubien and Bent, the latter having replaced Miranda 
as an active participant in the grant. With war scares rumored 
daily, the promoters continued their plans to settle the land near 
El Ponil. The efforts were interrupted by the American capture of New 
Mexico in 1846 and the revolt in 1847 which resulted in the death of 
Charles Bent. Eventually the son-in-law of Beaubien, Lucien B. Max-
well, inherited the Miranda-Beaubien grant after years of litigation. 49 
In relations between the Americans and the Mexicans at this time, 
both apparently felt they were wronged by the other, and both tried 
to exploit the other as much as possible. Armijo realized that the 
department depended on the revenues received through the entrance of 
goods from the United States and knew that he could not place too many 
restrictions on the Americans and foreigners without endangering this 
47 . / 
Martinez to Archuleta, Santa Ee, June 8, 1844, MA~. 
48 .,,, 
Martinez to naturalized foreigners, Santa Fe,. January 4, 1845, 
MANM~ 
49Murphy, "The Beaubien and Miranda Land Grant, 1841-1846," 40. 
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source of revenue. Martinez made several attempts to enft>rce the 
collection of legal dut.ies. When he did, he was violently cidticized 
for his policy and accused of stealing the revenues collected. During 
his second tenn in office, Annijo reverted to the traditional arrange-
' 
ment which allowed the officials to be bribed into reducing the taxes •. 
Not only was he likewise accused of pocketing the funds from the 
customs but also the Mexican officials were shocked by his toleration 
of such occurrences. Americans, on the other hand, attempted to make 
as much profit from the trade as possible with as little pe.rsonal 
expense to themselves. In truth they accomplished both of these goalsi 
profits were large, and taxes were low--or not paid at all. Clearly, 
the departmental government was caught between Mexican parochialism and 
American expansionism. These problems of the New Mexican government 




The growing conflict between Americans and New Mexicans increased 
with the annexation of Texas. By July of 1845, the news had reached 
Santa Fe that the United States Congress had approved this annexationll 
and departmental officials became resigned to the prospect that an 
invasion from the north would be simply a matter of time. Although 
removed from the centers of governmental intrigue, the New Mexicans 
realized that diplomatic relations were worsening between the United 
States and Mexico, and that by right of inheritance the Texan question 
was now an American problem. As war had existed between Mexico and 
Texas before annexation, they had little doubt that war would soon 
exist between Mexico and the United States after annexation. Once 
again, Armijo would be called upon to defend his department. His role 
in the American capture of Santa Fe has been disputed by many his-
torians, but his actions were only a logical continuation of his pre-
vious pragmatic administrations. Circumstances over which the governor 
had no control would combine to form an impossible dilemma for Armijo. 1 
Events during 184,5 forecasted the nature of the conflict. To the 
north of the Arkansas newspapers carried stories of how the "glorious 
spirit of annexation is spreading like a prairie fire up the R{o del 




Norte, and rattling the dried bones in New Mexico. 112 There was little 
doubt that New Mexico was ready for the benefits of democracy and the 
American tradition of freedom. New Mexicans, however, were not con-
vinced of these blessings. · Articles in the newspaper from Santa Fe 
condemned the thieves of the north who had stolen part of their country 
by annexing Texas; New Mexicans could not understand how a nation that 
. 3 called itself Christian could do such a thing. The never-ending bat-
tle over Mexico's refusal to pay what it believed to be inflated 
claims, the location of the boundary between the two countries, and 
the unstable Mexican government cau?ed both the Mexicans and the Ameri-
cans to feel that war was iminent. 
Unfortunately for New Mexicans, the department during 1845 was 
hampered by resignations and appointments within, and jurisdictional 
and territorial changes from without. Not until November of 1845 was 
Armijo formally appointed as governor after Mart:&iez' resignation in 
April. Under orders from President Herrera, patriotic councils were to 
be established in the departments. The governors were to appoint mem-
hers to the council, whose purpose would be to coordinate matters of 
4 
defense and initiate patriotism in the department. In addition, 
another decree joined New Mexico, Durango, and·Chihuahua as one com-
mandancy generaliship, thus ending Armijo's role as military conunander. 
Juan Andres'° Archuleta was appointed principal coi:rimandant for New 
2st. Louis Missouri Reporter, May 16, 1845. 
3 
Santa Fe El Payo de Nuevo Mejico, August .7, 1845, MANM. 
4Armijo to minister of the treasury, Santa Fe, November 28, 1845, 
MANM. 
5 Mexico under jurisdiction of the commandant general in Durango. 
Further complications arose in December of 1845 when Mariano Paredes 
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led a successful revolution iigainst the govermnent of Herrera and came 
to power in January 1846. Parades apparently restored Armijo to the 
position of commandant general by March of 1846 and did away with the 
combined form of departmental defense. These upsets within the central 
Mexican govermnent undoubtedly caused much grief for Armijo at a time 
when Anglo invasion was most immediate, and assistance and stability 
were greatly needed by the governor. Correspondence to the gove.rnor 
from Mexican authorities became rare, and the last letter that Armijo 
received before the American arrival told him only that diplomatic 
relations had been broken between the United States and Mexico--not 
h . d 6 tat war existe. 
The early months of 1846 found the department of New Mexico in 
its usual state of financial crisis. The departmental assembly be-
came a main center of political activity in the province. Donaciano 
Vigil, a member of the assembly who had risen from the military ranks 
to some prominence, provided needed leadership during these last few 
months. Vigil moved that the assembly allow all munitions to come 
into the department duty free, and also moved that an inventory of 
the year's expenses still•in arrears might be made so that some of 
the outstanding bills might be paid with the revenues expected from 
5The exact date of Archuleta's appointment to this position is 
unknown.· After December 4, 1845, cor:respondence from Archuleta is 
prefaced with this title. 
6Minister of war to Armijo, Mexico, June 4, 1846, MANM. 
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the first trade caravans. This measure passed in May of 1846. 7 
The news of the caravan's approach was followed closely, for 
with its arrival the officials hoped to receive information concerning 
the Americans along with badly needed revenue. On June 26, the cara-
van arrived and the traders confirmed the rlmtors of war bet:ween the 
two countries. One of these traders, Adolfo Speyers, the partner of 
Armijo in the trade, reported that American troops were approaching 
New Mexico. With this news Armijo sold his share of the business to 
Speyers and readied New Mexicans for battle. 8 New Mexicans cheered 
the inflammatory speeches of officials trying to arouse patriotism, 
but when the crowds became mob-like, troops were called in to protect 
9 the property of Americans and foreigners still in the department. 
On June 30, Wislizenus arrived in Santa Fe and dispelled the rumors 
of immediate attack. He wrote that Armijo was alarmed over reports 
of war, although the citizens were indifferent. Wislizenus told the 
governor that no troops were ready when he left Bent's Fort and that 
if they started at all they could hardly reach New Mexico in less 
10 than two months. With this information Armijo advised the militia, 
which he previously had called to Santa Fe, to return to their homes 
as there was no immediate danger of an attack by the Americans. 11 
7 Bloom, "New Mexico Under Mexican Administration," Vol. II, 
354-6. 
8susan Shelby Magoffin, Down the Santa Fe Trail and Into Mexico: 
~ Diary of Susan Shelby Mag~n;-1"846-184-:r-(New Hav'en:~le Uni-
versity Press, 1962), pp. 96-7n. 
9 Lavender, Bent's Fort, p. 225. 
lOWislizenus, ''MetJl£)i:;i:-s.,1' p. 20. 
llArmijo to prefect of the north, Santa Fe, June 30,. 1846, MANM. 
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By early July .Armijo had definite information of an impending 
invasion, which he believed would'come at the end of August. In 
order to unite the department he appealed to the departmental assembly, 
/ . 
through Tomas Ortiz, to givE! the)governor dictatorial powers and to 
declare martial law throughout New Mexico. The assembly could not 
reach a decision, however, resulting in .. these requests not being 
12 
granted. In addition to these actions, Armijo ordered Gregorio 
Vigil at the presidio of Bado to send six men with a trusted com-
mander on a reconnaissance mission. They were to scout the area of 
h A k R. d . · f Am · l3 t e r ansas iver an report any sign o an erican army. 
The revenues that the department received from the caravan at 
the end of June evidently did not provide the necessary funds for the 
departments, for the possibility of a forced loan was discussed on 
July 18. Agreement was reached that time was running short .for New 
Mexicans and that conscription should begin immediately. All men over 
14 
a&e si~teen and under age fifty-nine were to be readied for war. 
In order to solve the financial and military crisis, Armijo called 
for a meeting of the most influential men in the department. He wrote 
that it was positively known that forces of the United States were 
coming to attack New Mexico. An immediate solution was needed for 
h lf f h d · · · ld d 15 t e we are o t e epartment, or its existence wou · · en • 
12session of the departmental assembly, Santa Fe, July 13, 1846, 
in Bloom, "New Mexico Under. Mexican Administration," Vol. II:, 357-8. 
13Armijo to Vigil, Santa Fe, July 12, 1846, MANM. 
14Arrn.iJo to prefect qf the north, Santa Fe, July 18, 1846, MANM.· 
15A · · p l M . / S F J 1 11 1846 . . K l h rmiJo to ascua artinez, anta e, u y , , in e e er, 
Turmo i 1, p • 9. 
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During the first weeks of August attention again centered on the 
assembly as officials and citizens argued about. tl~e fate of the gov~rn,- · 
/ ,,,, 
ment. On August 6, Serafin Ramirez reported that the departmental 
treasury was empty and, furthermore, that salaries and other ob.ligations 
for the preceding two months were in arrears. Because of this lack of 
funds, Armijo once again was moved to ask for a forced loan. If reve-
nue could not be obtained, the governor said he would have to rely 
only on volunteers to defend the department. The a.ssembly decided 
that too much time would be wasted in att·empting to collect a forced 
loan. Therefore, General Armijo could take all necessary mea~ures for 
h f ·1· f . N M . 16 t e sustenance o mi itary orces in ew exico. 
With this new vote of confidence.Armijo issued a proclamation to 
the .citizens of New·Mexico. In it he reviewed the cqnflicting claims 
' to Texas between the United States and Mexico, writing that because 
Texas had been usurped by the United States it was necessary to suspend 
relations between the two nations. "At this very moment," he wrote, 
"forces of the United States are .now advancing an the department." 
He concluded the proclamation by saying "Let us be ready for war since 
we are provoked to it. Let us not look at the strength of our enemies, 
nor at the size of the obstacles we have to overcome,·~ •• Your governor 
is dependent upon your pecuniary resources, upon your decision, and 
. . "17 upon your conviction. · 
16sessions of the departmental assembly, Santa Fe, August 6-8, 
1846, in Bloom, •'New Mexico under Mexican Administration," Vol. II, 
360-2. 
17Proclamation of Armijo, Santa Fe, August 8, 1846, in Ralph 
Emerson Twitchell, The Military Occupation of New Mexico 1846-1851 
(Denver: The Smith-Brooks Company, 1909), pp. 60-3. 
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While these provisions were being made in New Mexico, Colonel 
Stephen Watts Kearny was approaching Santa Fe from Bent's Fort. On 
July 31, 1846, he issued a proclamation while at the fort in which he 
declared that he was entering New Mexico with a great military force, 
but that he sought only to seek union-and amelioratio~ for the citizens 
of New Mexico. He reconnnended that the inhabitants o.f New Mexico re-
main peaceful and assured them that the United States Army would not 
molest them. On the contrary, they would be respected and protected 
in all their rights, both civil and religious. However, those who 
refused his conditions and took up arms against the United States 
18 
would be looked upon as enemies. The conquest of New Mexico had 
begun. 
In pursuing his policy of a bloodless conquest, Kearny sent 
Captain Philip St. George Cooke ahead of the army to Santa Fe; Cooke 
later wrote, "The general [colonel at the time] greatly surprised me 
by a proposition that I should set out in advance, with a flag of 
19 
truce to Santa Fe." Cooke carried a letter to Armijo from Kearny 
in which he advised the governor that he intended to take possession 
of New Mexico, for the land rightfully was owned by the United States 
owing to the annexation of Texas. Kearny pledged to respect New Mexi-
can life, basically under the same conditions that had been given in 
his proclamation. Kearny ended by saying he wished to avoid any 
bloodshed, and that if Armijo resisted then he would be responsible 
18Proclamation of Kearny, Bent's Fort, July 31, 1846, in Keleher, 
Turmoil, p. 7. 
19Philip St. George Cooke, The Conquest of New Mexico and Cali-
fornia (Albuquerque: Horn and Wallace, 1964), p. 6. 
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for the sufferings, miseries, and bloodshed that would result for New 
Mexico, 2° Cooke and his companion James Magoffin were to present this 
letter to the governor and entreat him to turn the department over to 
the Americans. 
While Cooke went on ahead to Santa Fe, the American troops con-
tinued towards the capital also, On the tenth of August five Mexicans 
who had been sent to reconnoiter the American forces, were captured. 
They rode on very small jackasses and met with the laughter of the 
Americans when they were captured. Information from these men and also 
from Taos stated that Armijo had called all citizens to arms. He was 
reported as having about 2,000 pueblo Indians, 300 regulars, and 1,200 
Mexican militia, The troops were anxious for a fight and although 
half the Indians were indifferent on the subject they would be forced 
f . h 21 to 1.g t. 
Exactly what happened during the meetings of Cooke and Magoffin 
with the Mexicans will probably never be known. Kearny, at first, 
claimed only the east bank of the R~ del Norte, and in his letter 
to Armijo on August 1 asserted ownership only of the eastern portion 
of New Mexico. However, his orders gave him permission to continue to 
California at his own discretion, Magoffin, having recently arrived 
from discussions with President James K. Polk, knew only of the plans 
to establish control over the eastern portion of New Mexico as claimed 
by Texas. Possibly while Cooke met with Armijo and was told only that 
, ·.LL,. 
20 Kearny to Armijo, August 1, 1846, in Turmoil, pp. 7-8. 
21w. H. Emory, Notes of~ Military Reconnoissance from Fort 
Leavenworth, in Missouri, E2_ San Diego, in California, United States 
House of Representatives Executive Document, No._:!:!_, 30th Cong., 1st 
Sess., Serial No. 517, p. 28. 
the governor would set out on August 13 with six thousand men (an 
exaggeration), Magoffin was .doing the dirty work. 22 
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Perhaps the best theory is that Magoffin, after arriving in 
Santa Fe, met with Juan Andris Archuleta who was second in command of 
the army. He apparently suggested to Archuleta that Mexico could re-
tain the territory west of Rft del Norte since all the Americans 
claimed was the land to the east of the river. All Archuleta need do 
was to abandon Armijo and then, with the silent consent of the United 
,,,,,. 23 
States, make himself governor of the land west of Rio del Norte. 
The only definite facts concerning this incident are contained in 
Armijo's reply to Kearny of August 12. Armijo wrote that he could 
not agree to relinquish any Mexican territory, that he also did not 
want blqodshed, and that perhaps a meeting between the two could be 
arranged if Kearny did not cross the Sapello River. 24 
This theory of Archuleta deserting Armijo is substantiated by 
events prior to August 17 and the American entrance into Santa Fe. In 
a letter dated September 8, 1846, Armijo reported to his national 
government the circumstances that caused him to flee the department. 
On August 15 he gave orders for his 1,800 troops to march out of Santa 
Fe the twenty-five miles north to Apache Canyon. There, he said, he 
would meet them the next day with two hundred regulars. On the six-
teenth he joined forces but did not continue the march because the 
22 Cooke, Conquest, p. 28. 
23 
Lavender, Bent's Fort, pp. 262-3. 
24Armijo to Kearny, Santa Fe, August 12, 1846, in Max Moorhead, 
ed., "Notes and Documents," New Mexico Historical Review, Vol. XXVI 
(January, 1951), 81-2. 
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auxiliary companies were not disposed to fight. 25 
Armijo convoked a junta of officers on the night of August 16. 
He tried to arouse their patriotism but to no avail. The officers of 
the auxiliary units--of which Archuleta was one--refused to fight 
although Apache Canyon was a very strategic position. After these 
officers refused to fight, they retreated, leaving Armijo with the 
two hundred troops from Santa Fe. During the night more troops de-
serted, and the only companies that remained were those commanded by 
Ortiz, Martfnez, and sltfa. This left Armijo with seventy dragoons. 26 
This information is substantiated by Lieutenant W. H. Emory of 
Kearny's command who wrote that two thousand Mexicans were reported 
in the canyon to oppose the Americans but due to quarrels between 
27 their commanders they fled to the south. While Armijo departed for 
Chihuahua, he passed English trader George Ruxton, who wrote that 
Armijo was anxious to know what New Mexicans were saying of him. 
Ruxton told Armijo that the prevailing opinion was that he and his 
Mexicans were a pack of cowards. Armijo replied, "Adi~s, they don't 
know I had but seventy-five men to fight three thousand. What could 
I do? 1128 
One member of the governor's army later wrote that. Armijo could 
do little because of the undisciplined army and paucity of good 
25Armijo to minister of foreign relations, Chihuahua, September 
8, 1846, in Moorhead, "Notes and Documents." 76-8. 
26 Ibid. 
27 
Emory, Reconnaissance, p. 29. 
28George Frederick Ruxton, Adventures. in Mexico and the Rocky 
Mountains (New York: Harpers, 1848), p. 118. 
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leaders: "He was a dwarf against a giant. He had rashly rushed to 
give battle; it would have been equivalent to offer his troops as 
29 
victims to the invading army." Captain Cooke also wrote that Armijo 
was much superior to those about him, but even so, "he is unequal to 
the trying circumstances of his present situation." The patriotic 
spirit that he developed by his proclamation forced Armijo to lead and 
direct the enthusiasm of the people to some weak and disgraceful con-
1 . 30 c usion. Although it was possible that Armijo had sold out the 
department to the Americans, the above evidence suggests rather that 
Armijo was unable to rally his troops to defend New Mexico at a most 
critical time because many of his officers refused to fight. Armijo 
did the only thing that he could: retreat. 
During Armijo'· s term as governor and down through the years, 
the vivid picture of the cowardly New Mexicans led by their cowardly 
governor has served American self-interest in explaining this period. 
During the 1840's a mood of expansionism covered the land, and it was 
far more comforting to hear that New Mexico was backward, and its 
governor a tyrant who needed to be overthrown in order to· regenerate 
h 1 h h h . . . f h . 31 t e peop e, tan to ear t e true situation o t e province. In 
addition, the early sources of information that came to Americans were 
from expansionist-minded intellectuals like George Wilkins Kendall and 
Josiah Gregg in extremely prejudiced accounts of New Mexicans and their 
29Rafael Chacon in Read, Illustrated History of New Mexico (Santa 
Fe: New Mexican Printing Company, 1912), pp. 391:Z.~-
30 Cooke, Conquest, p. 33. 
31oaniel Tyler, ''Gringo Views of Governor Armijo," New Mexico 
Historical Review, Vol. XLV (January, 1970), 42. 
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barbarism. Another source of information came from uneducated adven-
turers in the trade,·~uleskinners and packers, whose dealings with the 
New Mexicans were limited to making a profit and having a good time, 
b h h f h 1 1 . . 32 ot at t e expense o t e oca citizens. 
New Mexico during 1837-1846 has been somewhat romanticized because 
of the Santa Fe Trail and the American involvement in 1846. That the 
United States conquered the department easily was not so much a tribute 
to Yankee ingenuity as it was to the incapacity of Mexico to deal ef-
fectively with frontier circumstances that were beyond the understanding 
of the central government. Governors Armijo and Marti'riez were faced 
with the inability of the national Mexican government to provide real-
istic legislation for the frontier department; a poorly equipped and 
trained army and militia; a departmental treasury that almost always 
was empty if not in arrears; widescale Indians depradations; foreign 
traders who gave both the means and the motives to these Indians to 
continue their savage way of life; periodic armed invasions either 
from Texans or Americans; and finally, lesser officials, who owing 
either to their poverty or their ambitions, could not be trusted. In 
view of these circumstances, it is a wonder that Manuel Armijo and 
Mariano Martfhez were able to provide as much stability and effective 
government as they did. Their impossible task of governing New Mexico 
under these circumstances ended on August 18, 1846, when Kearny raised 
the American flag over Santa Fe. 
32For sketches of some of these traders and participants see 
Henry Pickering Walker, The WagoD.masters (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1966). 
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